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In the twentieth century the international community has come to
recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of ba-
sic human rights .... Spurred first by the Great War and then the
Second, civilized nations have banded together to prescribe accepta-
ble norms of international behavior .... In the modern age, humani-
tarian and practical considerations have combined to lead the
nations of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental
human rights is in their individual and collective interest .... Indeed,
for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become-like the pirate
and slave trader before him-hostis humani geneirs, an enemy of all
mankind.1
I. THE POLLACK CASE AS MODEL FOR OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS CASES
On August 30, 1998, sixteen people filed a class-action suit in the
United States District Court of New York for the Eastern District alleg-
ing overwhelming violations of human rights, such as torture, humiliation,
and conversion of labor.2 The complaint chronicles the sixteen plaintiffs'
experiences during the Holocaust3 and alleges that the defendants, Ger-
man corporations now doing business in the United States, conspired
with Hitler's government to enslave them.4 Helene Pollack, the first
plaintiff named in the complaint, and the others, allege that the Nazis
made the plaintiffs suffer at the hands of the corporations by forcing them
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
2. See Class Action Complaint 1, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499 (E.D.N.Y.
flied Aug. 30, 1998) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
3. See iL at 3-12 (listing each plaintiff's individual experiences in concentration camps
during WWII).
4. See id. at 1-2 (describing the cause of action as illicitly profiting from forced labor).
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to work for the defendants.5 The Pollack plaintiffs further allege that
these corporations profited from their labor without ever compensating
their victims.6
Each of the defendants is organized under the laws of Germany or
Austria.7 According to the plaintiffs' allegations, however, the corpora-
tions have significant business ties to the United States, thereby bringing
them within the jurisdiction of United States courts.8
On the heels of the Pollack suit, and others like it, a dozen German
companies have obligated themselves to contribute monies into a general
fund to compensate their World War II (WWH) slave laborers.9 Some of
the companies involved in the general settlement are the same companies
named as defendants in the Pollack suit" The companies involved in
setting up the fund, are committed for various reasons. One unifying
goal, however, is to block suits like Pollack from continuing in the juris-
diction of U.S. courts." For example, Deutsche Bank, a possible defend-
ant in the Pollack case, is in the midst of acquiring Bankers Trust, a U.S.
bank. 2 Jewish groups have threatened to block the take over if Deutsche
Bank does not join in the settlement.1 3 For German businesses as a
whole, the bad publicity from the lawsuits is threatening their export reli-
ant industries.' 4 Nevertheless, some companies have expressed a moral
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 13-16 (describing each defendant-corporation, their subsidiaries, and their
successors in interest individually). The defendants named in the suit are Siemens AG,
Krupp AG, Henkel AG, Diehl & Co., Bayeriche Motoren Werke (BMIV), Daimler-Benz
AG, Allegemeiner Elektrik Gesellschaft AG (AEG), Telefunken AG, Messerschmitt,
Volkswagen AG, Audi AG, Leica AG, Wurttembergische Metalwarenfabrik AG (NVMF),
and MAN AG. See id.
8. See id. at 2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994) as the
basis for the court's jurisdiction).
9. See Tony Czuczka, Slave Labor Fund Set (visited Feb. 17, 1999)<http'dI
abcnews.go.comlsectionslvorldlDailyNewslnazi990217.html> (reporting the creation of a
reparation fund by German companies like Deutsche Bank, Daimler-Benz, Daimler-
Chrysler, and Siemens).
10. See id. (stating that it is still unclear how many German companies will contribute
to the reparation fund).
11. See id. (emphasizing that German corporations are "seeking a U.S.-German ac-
cord blocking further legal action in the United States").
12. See Talks on Establishing German Fund for Holocaust Victims Move Fonvard (vis-
ited Feb. 10, 1999) <http'J/www.cnn.com/WORLDeurpoe/9902l09/germany.holocaust.02/
index, html> (reporting that "Deutsche Bank [Germany's largest Bank] is seeking ap-
proval for a $10.1 billion merger with Banker's Trust, the eighth-largest U.S. bank").
13. See id. (citing Deutsche's recent disclosure that it helped build the Auschwitz
death camp).
14. See German Official to Push Holocaust Reparations Plan (visited Feb. 8, 1999)
<http:Iww.cnn.comfUS/9902/07/BC-GERIhANY-USA-HOLOCAUST.reut> (explain-
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responsibility toward their former victims'5 and generally want to enter
the twenty-first century with a clean slate.' 6 It is ironic, however, that
these companies are now taking this position; just a few decades ago
these same companies' official positions were that they owed no duty to
their former slaves. 7 Ed Fagan, one of the attorneys for the Pollack
plaintiffs, has stated that more companies would have to contribute to the
fund before the Pollack plaintiffs agree to non-suit.1 '
In this comment I propose that the plaintiffs resist being bullied by
international organizations and litigate this case to its completion in a
New York courtroom. A successful claim would be a step forward in the
enforcement of human rights. With the precedent of a success in the Pol-
lack case, any violator who commits a crime against humanity may be
held responsible in the United States for their actions. The Pollack court
has the opportunity to make the footprints that other federal courts, as
well as other countries' judicial systems, should follow.19
The parties involved, with the awesome underlying history of WWII
crimes behind them, are obligated by the moral mandates of history to
properly preserve the legacy of the Holocaust. Today, monuments er-
ected at the sites of Nazi concentration camps embody the legacy of the
Holocaust as "Nie Wieder" (never again). Consequently, the proper leg-
acy of the Holocaust is to never allow such a massive violation of human
rights to happen again to any people.
This Comment stands for the proposition that the protection of human
rights is the loftiest of all the world community's goals and that all nations
ing that the push for a fund comes among "fears that Germany's export-reliant business
interests could be severely damaged" and that "the lawsuits could be used by others to gain
a competitive edge over German businesses").
15. See Terence Nelan, Germany's Settlement Plan (visited Feb. 17, 1999) <http://
abenews.go.comlsectionslworldlDailyNewslslavelabor98l2ll3.html> (reporting that Ger-
man Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder has stated that German industry has a moral obliga-
tion to pay restitution); Responsibility for the History of the Company (visited Feb. 5,1999)
<http:llwww.daimler-benz.com/specials/zwangs/verantw-e.html> (commenting that
Daimler-Benz has a moral responsibility toward its former forced laborers).
16. See Nelan, supra note 15 (quoting a historical expert who states that Germany
wants to have its war time role finally settled by the end of the year).
17. See BENJAMIN B. FEnmlcz, Lass THAN Sr.AvEs 121, 230 (1979) [hereinafter LEss
T.i" SLAvr~s] (recounting how in 1962 Siemens stated that it had no legal or moral obli-
gations towards its former victims).
18. See Czuczka, supra note 9 (reporting Fagan's statement that although the fund was
"a step in the right direction," it still did not have the contribution of "all the industry"
involved).
19. See Kathryn Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of ictims: Abolishing Forum Non
Conveniens in Human Rights Litigation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 41, 79-80 (1998) (arguing that
the "United States has a strong interest in influencing the evolutionary process by which
international norms emerge and are applied").
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in the world community are charged with protecting human rights 20
Holding human rights violators accountable to their victims is part and
parcel to the task of ensuring that human rights are protected21 The
world community, however, has not established an international tribunal
which allows private victims to hold their oppressors accountable. 22 The
lack of an international tribunal which strictly focuses on human rights
violations leaves individual countries with the responsibility of enforcing
20. The United Nations Charter, for example, encompasses the world community's
goal of protecting an individual's human rights. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3 (making
the signatories of the U.N. Charter responsible for "achiev[ing] international cooperation
in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian charac-
ter, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"); Thomas C.
Buergenthal, The Human Rights Revolution, Address Before the St. Mary's University
School of Law Human-Rights Symposium (Feb. 15, 1991), in 23 ST.MARY's lJ. 3,5 (1991)
(advancing the proposition that people all over the world now believe that it is the govern-
ment's job to protect and respect human rights); Gare A. Smith, A Human Rights Agenda
for the Next Administration, 3 ILSA T. IN'L & COMP. L 653, 656-57 (1997) (explaining that
since the end of the Holocaust there has been a special urgency in the global community to
structure a system that protects human rights); see also Andr6 Douglas Pond Cummings,
Note, Just Another Gang: "When the Cops Are Crooks Who Can You Trust?", 41 How.
LJ. 383, 386 (1998) (commenting that protecting human rights is an indispensable part of
United States foreign policy).
21. See Colloquy, The Prosecution of War Criminals & Violations of Human Rights in
the U.S., 19 WHri-rmg L. Rv. 281, 293 (1997) (arguing that "one of the main tasks of
those who work for human rights has been to ensure that human rights standards are im-
plemented and enforced in the United States.. ."); Benjamin B. Ferencz, International
Criminal Courts: The Legacy of Nuremberg, 10 PACE INT'L L Rtv. 203,234 (1998) (warn-
ing that it is a spite to the victims and an urging of more atrocities when the world commu-
nity condemns massive crimes, without bringing to justice those responsible for the
crimes); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE LJ. 2537,2542 (1991) (discussing the arguments in
favor of prosecuting those people who commit human rights violations); Eileen Rice, Note,
Doe v. Unocal Corporation: Corporate Liability for International Human Rights Viola-
tions, 33 U.S.F.L. R Ev. 153, 171 (1998) (asserting that by holding liable a corporation
whose business partner violated human rights, the Unocal court "affirmed the opinions of
many Americans who support protection of international human rights").
22. See Colloquy, War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects, 13 Amt. U.
INT'L L. REv. 1383, 1407 (1998) (asserting that it was not the failure of the Nuremberg
Tribunal that the international community did not build a system to protect human rights);
Kenneth L Port, The Japanese International Law "Revolutiont: International Human
Rights Law and its Impact on Japan, 28 STArN. 3. IrLr' L 139, 140 (1991) (pointing out that
human rights laws have little effect on behavior because there is little enforcement of
human rights); see also Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Re-
store Democracy: International Legal Implications of the Ecowas Intervention in Sierra Le-
one, 14 Am. U. INT'L L. Rv. 321, 401 (1998) (bemoaning an international system that still
has to rely on individual states to enforce international human rights).
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international human fights standards. 3 Because there is a lack of prece-
dent for protecting international human rights in the United States, a
model case is needed to further strengthen the precedent being devel-
oped in the Second Circuit of allowing claims based on heinous crimes
committed in other parts of the world.24 I propose that Pollack can serve
as a model of how victims of human rights violations can find the justice
they deserve.
Section II of this Comment, focuses on the Nazi German concentration
camps, where unspeakable crimes against humanity occurred during
World War II.2. Enslavement in concentration camps was one of the
steps in the Nazi tyrants' scheme for destroying the European Jews and
23. See HuA" RIGHTS IN THE WORLD CosmluNrrY 286 (Richard Pierre Claude &
Bums H. Weston eds., 2d ed. 1992) (proposing that individual nations are responsible for
implementing human rights standards when they are signatories to the United Nations
Charter).
24. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (granting jurisdiction to
claims based on violations of international law); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876, 887
(2d Cir. 1980) (granting original jurisdiction based on the Alien Tort Statute).
25. The Germans started building concentration camps as part of their plan to exploit
slave labor and detain people who they considered opponents of Germany. See Adolf
Stone, Slave Labor Camps of the Third Reich, Soc. EDuc., Oct. 1983, at 396. Dachau was
the first concentration camp; it started holding prisoners in 1933. See id. at 396-97. The
Germans used the camps to terrorize the communities they controlled. See LENI YAHIL,
THE HoLocAusr. Tim FATE OF THE EUROPEAN JE R , 1932-1945 at 133 (1990). In gen-
eral, the camps' conditions were deplorable. See id. at 133-35. In the 1940's some of the
camps, including the notorious camp Auschwitz, became extermination centers where large
groups of people were killed. See Chuck Feree, Auschwitz Revisited (visited Feb. 3, 1999)
<http://remember.orgleducateauschwitz. html>.
26. See CHRISTOPHER SIMPSON, ThE SPLEDm BLOND BEAsr:. MoNEY, LAW, AND
GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTrIEH CENTURY 27-41 (1995) (describing the German industrial-
ists of the World War II era as being instrumental in the Nazi Holocaust). In terms of the
present discussion on holocaust claims, one can argue that the history of the term "crimes
against humanity" begins post World War I. See id. at 27-28. World War I also saw its
share of serious atrocities. There was much debate after the war over whether the Treaty
of Versailles should require Germany to take responsibility for the atrocities committed
during the war. See id. at 25-27. This never materialized, however, because certain fac-
tions, namely the Americans, wanted to protect Germany from paying reparations. See Id.
at 3741. These factions wanted to reestablish German industry in order to allow German
economy to grow again. See id. America's hesitation becomes relevant later in the discus-
sion of World War 11 because the same American faction, with close ties to the German
industrial leadership, allowed German leaders to go unpunished for their role in the Nazi
horrors. See id. at 2741.
Unlike in WWI, the victorious Allies of WWII signed a charter that established the
International Military Tribunal (IMT) which, to some extent, attempted to make wrongdo-
ers face their crimes. See Ferencz, supra note 21, at 211. The three crimes prosecuted were
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. See id. "The evidence,
based in large part on captured German records, was overwhelming that crimes of the
greatest cruelty and horror had been systematically committed pursuant to official policy."
[Vol. 1:153
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION
other minorities the Nazi tyrants deemed less superior. '  Children and
the feeble died immediately in Nazi gas chambers, while people who were
physically strong had their lives wrung out like wash cloths. 5 Several
leading authorities have detailed German industry's extensive involve-
ment in the Nazi extermination process? 9
An additional discussion in Section II includes the West German gov-
ernment's reparation programs, as well as private dealings between sev-
eral companies and the representatives of slave laborers. Since the 1950's
the West German government has been paying billions of dollars to vari-
ous Jewish interests, including the state of Israel.30 Also, in the 1950's
and 60's there were tumultuous negotiations between Holocaust slave la-
borers and their former slave masters; these were characterized by insin-
cere attempts to compensate Holocaust victims." Section II concludes
by discussing two lawsuits which are forerunners to the Pollack case. The
Pollack lawsuit fits into a distinct line of legal actions known as holocaust
claims? 2 Volumes of historical evidence show that these claims have
Id. at 212. Some of the crimes prosecuted under the heading crimes against humanity were
enslavement and extermination. See id.
27. See 3 RAUL HILBERG, THF DESMUcnoN oF THE EUROPEAN JEws 917-18 (1985)
(discussing the purpose behind the enslavement of the Jews in concentration camps which
was to provide a labor pool to work in the war industry while moving towards systematic
extermination); SiNpsoN, supra note 26, at 88 (recounting the plight of Jewvish, Russian,
Polish, French, and Ukranian people that were enslaved by the German government in
concentration camps and forced to work in private industry for war production or agricul-
tural industries during the Holocaust).
28. This describes the pattern followed by the Germans when choosing their forced
laborers. However, the Nazis also killed perfectly healthy adults who were able to perform
labor. See LEss THAN SLAvEs, supra note 17, at 17-18; Sumi, soN, supra note 26, at 88-89.
29. See generally LEss THAN SLAvEs, supra note 17 (chronicling the extensive use of
slave labor during WWII by German industrialists); SrnbusON, supra note 26 (illustrating
German industrialists role in the Holocaust).
30. See German Restitution for National Socialist Crimes (visited Feb. 13,1999) <http:/
Iwwv.germany-info.orglfactslrestit.htm> (describing the full history of the German restitu-
tion programs).
31. See, e.g., LEss THAN SLAvEs, supra note 17 at 81-88, 117-22 (describing the negoti-
ations with Krupp and Siemens).
32. When CNN reported the Pollack case on their website, they organized the case
into the "Holocaust Claims" section. See Nazi-Era Slaves Sue Firms (visited Aug. 31,
1998)<http //cnnfi.com/hotstoriescompanies980S/31/holocaust>. There are other claims
like those in Pollack which also fall under the holocaust claims category. See Meg Fletcher
Crain, Holocaust Claims-No Easy Ansyers, AuroMorvE Nnvs EUROPI, Sept. 14,1998, at
1. Another litigation that has been classified under the holocaust claims category is the
Swiss Bank claims. These cases were bought by holocaust survivors or their heirs in order
to recover funds that were placed in Swiss bank accounts before the start of World War IL
See Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks and International Human Rights, 31
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L 325,332 (1998). In August of 1998 the parties in the Swiss Bank
claims settled out of court for $1.23 billion. See David Rohde, The Lawsuits Pile Up,
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merit.33 Accordingly, this Comment will not focus on how to prove a
slave labor claim in a court room. Instead, in Section II of this Com-
ment, I focus on the legal procedural barriers that the Pollack plaintiffs
and other similarly situated human rights victims face before they even
reach opening statements.
As an introduction to the legal concepts of the Pollack case, I discuss
two landmark decisions, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala34 and Kadic v. Karadzic,35
handed down by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The rul-
ings in both these cases, I believe, set the precedent for a successful claim
on part of the Pollack plaintiffs.
Section II further analyzes whether the Pollack court has jurisdiction
over the parties. The defendants will likely raise the issue of jurisdiction
as a bar to the plaintiffs' claims.36 The circumstances alleged by the Pol-
lack plaintiffs occurred in Europe; as such, the defendants' may argue
that U.S. courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over them. They may further
argue that the traditional basis for jurisdiction, such as the geographic
principle, will not give the court jurisdiction in this case. The plaintiffs,
however, are all United States citizens and they have alleged that each of
the defendant-companies, by doing business and having offices in the
Matching the List of Atrocities, N.Y. TMEs, Sept. 13, 1998, at 6. There are also current
lawsuits seeking restitution from insurance companies which issued life insurance policies
between 1920 and 1945 to persons killed during the Holocaust. There are approximately
29 companies named in the lawsuit. See Relatives of Holocaust Victims Add 20 Plaintiffs
and 10 European Insurers to Their Class Action, MnAuY's INs. L. W/LY., July 14,1997, at
1. Several task forces organized in both New York and.California have been organized in
order to expedite the insurance claims. See California and New York Reach Separate Peace
on Holocaust, 12 FED. & ST. INS. W., Apr. 13, 1998, at 15. These types of claims are not
limited to the Germans, however, several Japanese companies have also been accused of
using slave labor in Japanese courts. See Donald Macintyre, Inside Story: World War 1L
Imperial Japan Inc. On Trial, ASIA WEEK, Nov. 15, 1996.
33. See generally Ferencz, supra note 21 (citing the Nurenberg, Trials, the Hague Con-
vention and "other prevailing customs of civilized nations who rejected Germany's argu-
ment that the rules of war had become obsolete"); LEss ThN SALvES, supra note 17
(describing graphically the stories of millions of conscripted salve laborers).
34. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (granting original jurisdiction based on the Alien Tort
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)).
35. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (granting jurisdiction for violations of international
law).
36. Cf Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam) (stating that the district court dismissed the suit because of lack of jurisdiction);
Fishel v. BASF Group, 175 F.R.D. 525, 527 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (describing a slave labor
claim which was challenged on jurisdictional grounds).
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United States, have sufficient contacts with the country to bring them
within the jurisdiction of its courts.3 7
The last two subsections of Section III address additional legal issues
emanating from the Pollack case. The incidents making the basis of this
lawsuit occurred over fifty years ago. Because of the passage of time, the
defendant corporations will likely argue that this lawsuit is untimely and
should be barred.38 I will discuss the issue of statute of limitations, in-
cluding how the plaintiffs might successfully argue that the statute of limi-
tations should be tolled because of defendants' attempts to prevent such
claims. Finally, I address the issue of forum non conveniens.39 This issue
will likely be raised because Germany is an alternate forum which pro-
vides the defendants greater geographic advantages. Out of fairness for
the plaintiffs and in the interest of justice, I suggest that the United States
is the correct forum for the Pollack suit, as well as other similar types of
human rights claims.
II. THE UsE OF SLAvE LABOR DURiNG WORLD WAR 11
A. A Slave Laborers' Account
During the third week of September 1943, a Director of the Krupp
installation at Fuenfteichen, Germany, arrived at the Birkenau quar-
antine Lager of Auschwitz to select able-bodied inmates of the KZ
[concentration camp] to work at his plant. The prisoners, completely
naked, were paraded before him... I was one of those chosen and
thus became separated from my father... I was 16 years old... I
remember very distinctly how.., at a motion from the Krupp repre-
sentative the SS man, standing nearby, hit my father across the face
with force that broke his eye-glasses. This is how I left my father and
made my acquaintance with the Krupp enterprises for which I was
destined to work for 15 terrible months ... I was always hungry,
sleepy, filthy, tired beyond any normal human comparison, and most
of the time by any normal human standards, seriously ill... When-
ever a prisoner sneaked closer [to the oven] to warm his stiff hands,
he was chased away and usually beaten by the Krupp people. Beat-
ing and torture administered by the Krupp supervisory personnel
37. See Class Action Complaint 3-16, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499
(E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 30,1998) (on file with The Scholar. St. Afary's Lav Review on Minor-
ity Issues).
38. See, eg., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1547 (NJD. Cal. 1987) (consid-
ering the statute of limitations issue in a human rights claim).
39. See Boyd, supra note 19, at 41(describing human rights cases where forum non
conveniens has been used to dismiss the cases and proposing that in the interest of justice,
our judicial system must stop using the concept in human rights cases).
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was not uncommon. At work we were Krupp's charges... Hungry,
cold, stiff, from hard labor, lack of sleep and beating, and in constant
fear of our masters we were forced to exert all of remaining energies
to make guns for our oppressors. We worked until we dropped.40
The Pollack plaintiffs claim that the Holocaust should be viewed as if it
were "one giant robbery."'" The Nazi SS42 stole their lives, Swiss Banks
stole their money, European insurance companies stole their insurance
claims, some companies stole their gold fillings, and the Pollack plaintiffs
claim the defendants stole their labor.43
B. Germany's Need for Labor in Waging World War II
The scarcity of labor in the German work force was one of the main
obstacles Germany faced in waging World War I. 4 During WWI, Ger-
many also faced the problem of insufficient labor and at that point tried
to solve the labor shortage by conscripting large amounts of German wo-
men.' However, during the planning stages of WWII the Nazis found
the use of German women was abhorrent because of Nazi philosophy.46
40. LEss TaAN SLAVES, supra note 17, at 77-78 (quoting a statement made by Theo-
dore Lehmen, on June 30, 1958 regarding his experiences at a concentration camp).
41. See Dateline NBC: Just Rewards? (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 10, 1998)
[hereinafter Dateline NBC] (reporting that Ed Fagan, attorney for the Pollack plaintiffs,
"wants to retrieve what was stolen and return it to survivors").
42. In German pronounced "Schutzstaffel," the SS served as the bodyguards for the
Nazi party in its beginning stages and was organized by Hitler's cohort, Heinrich Himmler.
See 1 RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEws 200 (1985). Subse-
quently, the SS became involved in all aspects of the party's business. See id. When the
Nazis came to power in Germany they merged with the police. See id. During the Holo-
caust it organized the killing operations of Jews and others. See id. at 56,62.
43. See Dateline NBC, supra note 41 (reporting that only "a handful of slaves" ever
received retribution from their former slave masters).
44. The other two obstacles the Germans faced were the lack of raw materials and
foreign exchange. See Ulrich Herbert, Forced Labour, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
WORLD WAR H 379,380 (I.C.B Dear & M.R.D. Foot eds., 1995) (discussing a Nazi defense
report which listed the three main areas where Nazi expenditures were most needed).
45. See WILLIAM MANCHESTER, TmE ARMs OF KRUPP: 1587-1968, at 485 (1968) (ex-
amining Germany's shortage of manpower during WWII).
46. See Herbert, supra note 44, at 381 (explaining the conflict in the Nazi party regard-
ing the lack of labor to support a world war). The Nazis thought that women belonged in
the home and greatly mistrusted women having a role in industry. See MANCHEMR,
supra note 45, at 485. This contrasts with the United States where over three million wo-
men were recruited to work in the factories and with England where over two million were
recruited. See id. Nazis believed that the German people were the superior race and that
everyone was less. See generally Richard Overy, Nazi Ideology, in THE OxFoRD COMPAN-
ION TO WORLD WAR 11779,779-80 (I.C.B Dear & M.R.D. Foot eds., 1995) (describing the
development and characteristics of Nazi ideology).
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The alternative, equally unappealing to Nazi philosophy, would be con-
scripting foreigners into the labor force.47
Although initially they had not planned to exploit foreign labor, when
WWII began, the Germans started exploiting labor from the countries
they were conquering.48 In addition to the foreign civilians and prisoners
of war, the Germans began exploiting concentration camp labor around
1942.
49
Interestingly, the Nazis' use of Jews as forced laborers is ironic because,
as a result of the extermination plan, the Nazis themselves created a siza-
ble gap in their labor force."0 Germans felt that the Jews and others
could make a valuable contribution to the Fatherland before they were
exterminated." The Nazis had over seven million foreign civilians and
prisoners of war, mainly from Poland and Russia, in labor camps by the
end of World War I.1
An elaborate system of ordering slave labor from concentration camps
developed between German companies and the Nazi government.5 The
head of the slave labor ordering system was Albert Speer.- Hitler ap-
47. See Herbert, supra note 44, at 381 (writing that the Nazis thought that it would be
a threat to their purity as a people if they had to rely on foreign labor).
48. See NitAcHs-_mrt, supra note 45, at 485 (stating that without foreigners the Nazis
would have had no other alternatives).
49. See Herbert, supra note 44, at 384 (explaining that Speer's new concentration
camp system consisted of sending concentration camp labor out to businesses in groups of
500).
50. See 3 HLBERG, supra note 27, at 917 (noting that Nazis at the concentration
camps were poor caretakers of the manpower in their custody). The administrators who
determined whether people would either die in gas chambers or to go to work, did so in an
extremely careless manner. See id. at 918. There are documented instances where doctors
knew that strong men and women were arriving on a certain train load, but would not
properly sort the Jews, leaving potential laborers to die in the gas chambers. See id. In
1942, the Nazis actually reconsidered the extermination of the Jews in light of a need for
manpower and armaments. See LEss THAN SLi.AViS, supra note 17, at 17-18. At this point
Albert Speer was appointed by Hitler to determine what percentage of Jews could be "liq-
uidated." See id. Shortly after Speer was appointed to head the slave labor program, Bir-
kenau, the killing center at Auschwitz, was expanded. See id.
51. See MANcrmsT-R, supra note 45, at 489 (describing a discussion between Hitler
and the SS).
52. See Herbert, supra note 44, at 379 (reporting that the Nazis' practice of forced
labor was the most important incidence in history of large-scale use of slave labor since the
end of American slavery in the 191 century).
53. See 3 H.BERG, supra note 27, at 933-34 (describing a system wherein a company
would make its request in triplicate forms and submit it to the Speer ministry for a determi-
nation of whether the allocation of labor was justified).
54. See id. at 934. See also Carolyn L Speaker, What Lessons Can Be Learned From
the Personal History of Albert Speer? To My Mind, An Analysis of His Personality Allows
Us to Derive Some Very Important General Rules. One Lesson Is "Know Thyself," 30
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pointed Speer to be armaments minister in 1942; Fritz Sauckel would be
Speer's underling.55 Speer's job required him to place laborers where
they were needed most. 6 The German Army sustained an enormous loss
to their vehicles and other military equipment during the winter cam-
paign of 1942 against the Russians. 7 In response to the losses in March
of 1942, Speer ordered Sauckel to put all Germans into the labor force; if
that population left the labor pool inadequate, then Sauckel was to force
foreign laborers into the German labor pool. 8 During their testimony at
Nuremberg both men admitted that there was a discussion with Hitler
about whether forcing laborers into the labor pool was a violation of In-
ternational Law.5 9
Foreigners, however, were not Speer's only victims. The Speer bureau-
cracy and German companies jointly established an intricate plan to ex-
ploit concentration camp labor.6 A company would inform Speer of the
gap in their workforce and Speer would then order Sauckel to provide
the people to fill the need.61 These two men survived the war and were
tried in Nuremberg.62 Speer was freed from prison in 1966 and Sauckel
was hanged in 1946.3
CASE W. RFn. J. IT':. L. 601, 601-05 (1998) (reviewing HENRY T. KINo, THm TWo
WORLDS OF ALBERT SPEER: REFLECTIONS OF A NuRm Eo PROSECUTOR (1997)).
55. See JOSEPH E. PERSiCo, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL 162 (1994) (examining
the prosecution of Speer and Sauckel at Nuremberg).
56. See id.
57. See hL (discussing the appointment of Speer and Sauckel).
58. See id. at 162-63 (detailing the process followed by Speer and Sauckel in setting up
the supply of laborers).
59. See id. (noting a conversation between Speer, Sauckel, and Hitler regarding
whether conscription of foreigners was a violation of international law).
60. See id. at 163-64 (explaining that German manufacturers would provide Speer
with requests for manpower to satisfy .heir labor needs); 3 HILBERO, supra note 27, at 933-
34 (illustrating how Speer did not have enough concentration camp laborers to meet the
companies' orders); SIMPSON, supra note 26, at 85 (describing how companies would obtain
laborers only if they made a request and delineated exactly how they were going to house
and guard their prisoners).
61. See 3 HILBERG, supra note 27, at 934 (describing the system that developed be-
tween industry and the Speer office for requesting laborers); PERSICO, supra note 55, at
162-63 (describing how Speer and Hitler designated Sauckel as the bureaucrat in charge of
"bringing in workers").
62. See PERSICO, supra note 55, at 404 (describing the scene at Nuremberg when
Speer and Sauckel received their sentences).
63. See id at 404, 451 (explaining that Speer was sentenced to twenty years in prison
and Sauckel was given the death penalty).
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C. Historical Developments that Led to the Exploitation of
Concentration Camp Labor
European Jews have been mistreated by non-Jews since the reign of
Constantine in the fourth century.' However, the Nazi government's ex-
termination of the Jews during WWII was unprecedented; never before
had a European government tried to unilaterally destroy Judaism.65 Nev-
ertheless, the process of destroying German Jewry would be a daunting
task because it entailed removing Jews from every facet of German
society.66
1. Rise of the Nazi Party
After World War I,67 the German people brought the National Socialist
German Workers Party (The Nazi Party) to power." Although the party
did not form legal and political segments until 1930, immediately upon
the party's organization, Jews became the subject of mistreatment and, in
some cases, murder.69
64. See 1 HmBERG, supra note 42, at 5 (explaining that persecution of Jews started
centuries before the rise of the Nazi Party).
65. See 1. at 9 (describing the apparatus necessary for the Germans to implement
their plans to exterminate the Jews).
66. See id. at 55 (analyzing the destruction of the Jews not merely as a product of
German "laws or commands," but as a fusion of all parts of German society working to-
gether as a team to meet the goal of removing Jews from Europe).
67. During WWI the Turkish government instigated the genocide of a million
Armenians, a minority group within the Ottoman Empire. See SrmPsoN, supra note 26, at
28. The Armenians were worked to death building a railway line for German business
interests in lrkey. See id. The victorious nations of WWI agreed that the Armenian
genocide should be addressed. See id. at 31. Most of the victors also had strong feelings
that Germany should pay reparations. See id. at 16-17. Neither of these goals, however,
were fully administered to completion. See id. at 37, 45. The victorious western govern-
ments did not prosecute the criminals who had perpetrated the Armenian genocide be-
cause they did not want to forego their position in vying for Middle East oil. See id at 40-
41, 45. Also, there was serious opposition in certain western circles to giving effect to the
term "crimes against humanity." See id. at 27. Americans in the State Department after
WWI, like Robert Lansing and John Foster Dulies, contributed to this opposition by creat-
ing an international law framework that made it hard to address Nazi crimes. See id. at 97-
98. Bolstered by principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty, these men believed
that the Nazi government could do as it pleased to its civilians. See id.
68. See 1 HIBERG, supra note 42, at 31-32 (explaining the roots of anti-Jewish law in
the Nazi party). he Nazi party did not have to develop a new mind set among the Ger-
man people in order to ostracize the Jews because the foundation of anti-Jewish laws had
already been established for centuries. See id. at 31.
69. See id. at 34 (explaining that starting in 1931 there were brown shirt demonstra-
tions in front of synagogues where Jews were accosted).
1999]
THE SCHOLAR
Adolf Hitler, the leader of the Nazi party, became chancellor of the
German Reich in January of 1933.70 By March and April of the same
year, anti-Jewish legislation had been passed.7' On August 20, 1935, the
Nazi Party held a convention where it decided that it could not be unor-
ganized in its actions against Jews; its Jewish "problem" had to be solved
in an organized and legal manner.72 Even though certain groups of the
Nazi party wanted to disenfranchise Jews in a legal manner, others in the
party proposed physical violence toward Jews.7'
2. Disenfranchisement of the Jews From German Society
As the Nazi party alone could not perpetrate the Holocaust, every seg-
ment of German society became involved in the process that led to the
Holocaust.74 The civil services were responsible for writing the laws and
regulations, starting the process of concentrating Jews into city centers,
and later arranging for the transport of Jews to death camps.75 Without
the railroad companies and police department, which later became the
German SS, the transport to death camps would not have been possible.76
While Germany was at war, the army became involved in the destruction
process.77 Industry also became involved because it needed the labor of
70. See SnMPSON, supra note 26, at 59 (indicating Adolf Hitler initiated and carried out
the Holocaust).
71. See id. (noting that in less than three months Hitler's government generated de.
crees restricting Jews from work as doctors, dentists, lawyers, teachers, and civil servants);
see also 1 ILBB=RG, supra note 42, at 33 (describing the Third Reich's first anti-Jewish
legislation).
72. See 1 HnLBERG, supra note 42, at 36-37 (illustrating how unorganized actions
against the Jews adversely affected the German business world).
73. See id. at 38-39 (recognizing that after the decrees, certain sections of the Nazi SS
became restless, and initiated a riot). Members of the Nazi SS rioted because they wanted
to play a role in the actual implementation of the anti-Jewish destruction process. See id. at
38.
74. See SmPsoN, supra note 26, at 4-5 (describing how all segments of German society
were given "specialized tasks necessary for mass murder").
75. See I HuBERG, supra note 42, at 56 (explaining the German hierarchy of govern-
ment and community that developed over the centuries to become a machine that de-
stroyed the Jewish society).
76. See id. at 62.
77. See id. (noting that because the Army had control of certain areas they were dele-
gated extermination tasks).
[Vol. 1:153
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION
the Jews."8 Eventually, it was industry which masterminded the methods
for gassing the Holocaust's victims.7 9
Throughout the 1930's the Nazi government dispossessed Jews of their
property and forced a large portion of the Jewish population to emigrate
from Germany in a systematic attempt to take away Jewish wealth.' The
Germans began limiting Jewish employment as part of their economic
measures against the Jews.8 1 One of the first programs the Nazis en-
forced was the forced retirement of Jews from civil service.' Also, part
of the Nazi plan was to decrease Jewish presence within German
Colmmerce.s
3
The Nazi government had to rely on industry to a large degree to re-
move Jews from large and small businesses.' 4 Large German owned
firms, including some of the Pollack defendants, had Jewish employees.as
In some cases, these German owned businesses either forced their Jewish
employees to leave by retirement or the companies moved their Jewish
78. See id.; SmipsoN, supra note 26, at 5 ("By 1944 and 1945, leaders of major German
companies such as automaker Daimler Benz, electrical manufacturers AEG and Siemens,
and most of Germany's large mining, steelmaking, chemical, construction companies found
themselves deeply compromised by their exploitation of concentration camp labor, theft,
and in some cases complicity in mass murder.") (footnotes omitted).
79. See JOSEPH BoRuuN, THE CrME AND PUtIsMMNTr oF I.G. FAP.BEN 122-23 (1978)
(describing how I.G. Farben conspired with the commanders of the concentration camps to
develop Zyklon B, the gas used in the death camps' gas chambers).
80. See 1 HIBERG, supra note 42, at 83 (indicating that Germans took away Jewish
property in order to impoverish them).
81. See 1 HILBERG, supra note 42, at 83-93 (discussing the legal and societal process of
expropriation); Smn'soN, supra note 26, at 57 (describing the role of German business elite
during the Holocaust).
82. See 1 HILBERG, supra note 42, at 87-88 (giving an account of how Hitler snuffed
out a protest of his termination of civil servants who had served during WNI).
83. See id. at 94-95 (listing the many diverse areas of Germany's economy in which the
Jews had interests). In 1934, there were 21 large Jewish holdings that were taken over by
German companies. See SimpsoN, supra note 26, at 62. Two of these forced take-overs
were by Siemens. See id Many growing corporations, built mainly from the take-over of
Jewish-owned businesses, sold bonds on the world market to raise capital and to perpetu-
ate the Aryanization of still more companies. Id. at 63-64. A large majority of the German
companies, including Krupp, participated in aryanization of Jewish businesses. See id. at
66-67 (citing a study by Guenter Keiser in 1939).
84. See SnmpsoN, supra note 26, at 59 (stating that "[t]he Nazi party and the SS, not
the industrial and financial elite, initiated the Holocaust. But they succeeded in their pro-
gram of genocide only by enlisting [these groups].").
85. See 1 HtLBaER, supra note 42, at 91-94 (describing the complicated and extensive
task of removing Jews from German industry). An example of how dismissals worked is
illustrated by the way Abs Bank took over Creditanstalt when the Germans took over
Austria and soon thereafter kicked out its Jewish employees. See SIMPsoN, supra note 26,
at 72.
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employees to foreign divisions.8 6 Nazis ensured businesses' participation
in the process by providing financial incentives which allowed companies
to keep their ranks in German industry and their places in German
societyY7
Aryanization was a method the Nazis used to remove Jews from Ger-
man industry by selling Jewish businesses.88 Until 1938, Jews could vol-
untarily sell their businesses.89 After that time, however, the Nazis took
away that option and Jews were then forced to sell.9" In order to effectu-
ate that goal, Jewish owned businesses were marked with white paint on
the glass of their store-fronts with the word "Jude," German for Jew, so
that the German populace could easily identify them and boycott them. 1
Finally, the government revoked the licenses of all Jewish professionals,
including doctors and lawyers, leaving many with no livelihood.92 As the
expropriation process progressed, Jews were forced to concentrate into
city centers because they had to rely on each other for survival.93 When
the Jews were amassed in the large cities, the Nazis started separating the
86. See 1 HILMBERG, supra note 42, at 93. At times there was a great reluctance to
relieve Jewish employees because some businesses lost the efficiency of long time employ-
ees. See id. After 1938, the expulsions became more commonplace and devastating to
Jewish lives. See id- at 93-94.
87. See SnvpsoN, supra note 26, at 5 ("Aryanization laws created a profitable business
for banks, corporations, and merchants willing to enforce Nazi racial preferences."). There
is a tendency to think that the corporations participated in the genocide only when it was in
their best interest. See id. at 59-60. However, towards the end of the War the German
government and industry continued to participate in the Genocide of the European Jews
even though it was becoming financially inconvenient. See id. There is reason to believe
that without aryanization the Nazi party would not have stayed in power in the 1930's. See
id- at 68 (citing an economic argument presented by historian Arthur Schweitzer). There
was little division within the Nazi party because society as a whole prospered from stealing
Jewish property. See id. One area of the German government that especially benefited
from Jewish property was the Army, since much of the German military build-up was
funded by stolen Jewish property. See id. (citing Herman G6ring, the senior war mobiliza-
tion official, who stated that the two primary sources of funds for the German military
during WWII was Jewish property and the looting of the Austrian treasury).
88. See id. at 60 (defining Aryanization as forcing "the sale of Jewish-owned property
at a fraction of its value to ethnic German entrepreneurs").
89. See id. (stating that although the sale of the businesses were legally defined as
"voluntary," they were in fact forced to sell their property).
90. See id (noting that after the initial "voluntary" phase, Jews were forced to sell
their property, irrespective of the market cost, for whatever the Germans would offer).
91. See 1 Hanuno, supra note 42, at 98 (describing how the German people knew
specifically which establishments were Jewish owned).
92. See id. at 125 (describing how "the Ministerial bureaucracy wiped out, in six con-
secutive blows, the remaining structure of Jewish business and self-employed activity").
93. See id. at 158 (explaining the concentration of Jews into city centers).
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Jewish population from regular German society.94 The process of con-
centration was aided by several Nazi measures. Mingling among Jews
and non-Jews was highly restricted, as was travel.9s Eventually, those
Jews who lived outside of city centers were forced to sell their homes and
move into the Ghettos.96 Because the Jewish people started congregating
together in the centers of big cities, the Germans later found it easy to
move them to the concentration camps in the East.9
Poland had the largest Jewish population in Europe at the beginning of
World War 11.98 To a large degree, the Jews in Poland were already con-
centrated in the city centers when the Germans invaded Poland in 1939;
this made it easier for the Germans to close the Jews off from the rest of
the world in walled ghettos.99 Because the Germans could easily control
the large congregation of Jews in Poland, the devastation of Jews there
was extensive. Out of the 33 million people in Poland at the beginning of
the War over 3 million were Jewish. 100 There were 400,000 Jews in War-
saw and approximately 400,000 Jews in the entire country of Germany at
that time.' Beginning in 1939, Nazis started forcing both Jews and Gyp-
sies to leave Germany for Poland.'
D. Slave Labor System and the Pollack Defendant's Use of
Conscripted Labor
March 4, 1939 marked the beginning of forced labor for the Jews. 3
On this date, the Economy Minister pronounced that all Jews who were
unemployed would join labor projects."° At this beginning point of the
Holocaust, nearly all Jews were unemployed because there were no more
94. See id. at 158-59 (describing how the Nazi establishment, believing that the ordi-
nary German people were too friendly with the Jews, began making decrees to start sepa-
rating the Jews from the regular community).
95. See id. at 158-67 (describing various German policies directed at the Jews).
96. See id. at 171 (illustrating the housing restrictions placed on Jewish families).
97. See I HiLBERG, supra note 42, at 187 (observing that the Jewish population in
Germany between 1939 and 1940 was quickly dwindling away; the death rate vwras ex-
tremely high and the birth rate was almost nonexistent).
98. See id. at 189.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. (providing an analysis of Germany's population during the thirties).
102. See id. at 205-34 (describing the process of forcing Jews into the Ghettos of Po-
land; an example would be the Warsaw and Krakow ghettos where forced population
growth was achieved easily by utilizing the train systems).
103. See 1 HILBERG, supra note 42, at 145 (explaining the process of how the Jews
became susceptible to conscription into hard labor).
104. See id (describing the March 4, 1939 agreement between the President of the
Reich Labor Exchange and the Economy Ministry).
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Jewish professionals, businesses, or jobs for Jews in the government.105
By 1939, the German government had successfully forced all Jewish influ-
ence out of the German economy.
Despite the Jews' poor state of affairs, they maintained hope that if
they kept to themselves and worked hard in forced labor they would live
through Nazi rule." 6 In 1941, tens of thousands of Jews joined forced
labor projects just to get food.107 Some Jews were forced to labor in Ger-
man factories. 0 8 New laws were enacted to allow industry to exploit
Jews at their will; Jews could not decline to work if a German insisted.' 0 9
Jews had become a commodity. 10
When the Germans invaded Poland, they immediately put the Jews to
work."' They saw the potential man power the Jews provided."1 Ini-
tially, the organization of labor was done on a limited scale; invading
Germans were restricted to composing simple manual labor projects per-
formed mainly outdoors." 3 Although the Germans paid these workers
very little," 4 laborers were allowed to return home when their day was
finished. 115
105. See idL at 144-45 (detailing the effects of Arianization and describing the Jews'
loss of livelihood).
106. See id. at 146 (indicating that Jews were receiving less of the necessities of life
than ever before).
107. See iL 144-47 (recounting that labor projects, established by the Labor minister,
were intended to utilize Jewish man power, and segregate Jews' from non-Jewish labor
within private employment).
108. See id. at 146-47 (explaining that although Jews initially were paid for their labor,
the Labor Ministry set low wages for Jewish work and held that because "Jew labor was
only a commodity" Jews need not be paid for "holidays, family and children's allowances,
birth or marriage subsidies, death benefits, bonuses, anniversary gifts, compensatory pay-
ments," or travel allowances).
109. See 1 HILBERG, supra note 42, at 147-48 (stressing that "industry had been given
the right of almost unlimited exploitation: to pay minimum wages for maximum work").
After the Jews had been paid, most of their earnings were taxed away to the German
government. See id. at 148-49.
110. See id. at 146 (explaining how Jewish labor was considered a commodity).
111. See id at 249 (explaining that because the Polish Jews were poor, the Germans
found their labor more important than looting their property).
112. See id. (commenting that there "was no need for a forced labor system during
this period, but, to the Germans, the sight of thousands of Jews 'milling around'
(herumlungernde Juden) was a challenge that had to be met right away").
113. See id. at 253 (explaining that at first the forced labor consisted of tasks per-
formed for the military, but later the industrial complex started using forced labor).
114. See id at 251-52 (commenting that, if made, payments to Jews for their labor
were sporadic).
115. See 1 HILBERO, supra note 42, at 250 (describing that the "forced labor troops"
were organized by picking Jews in the streets, organizing them into columns and marching
them to labor site; "fa]t the end of the working day the Jews were released, and next day
the same procedure was started anew").
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Soon thereafter, the Nazi bureaucracy saw the need for a stricter or-
ganization of workers in order to conduct specialized projects." 6 In Feb-
ruary of 1940, slave laborers from the first concentration camps in Poland
started building an enormous anti-tank ditch stretching along the Polish/
Russian border." 7 By 1941, there were 45 camps in which over 25,000
people were toiling in heavy labor." 8 It took very little resources to get
the camps running.119 Because of a limited allocation of resources, living
and working conditions in the camps were despicable."z
Private companies were slow in utilizing the labor from the camps.' 2
1
However, by 1942 private German companies started their exploitation
of concentration camp labor in earnest.' A large majority of German
companies were apathetic about the innocent people they were exploiting
and in many cases, killing."z Their active role in Aryanization of Jewish
property and businesses in the 1930's is evidence of this fact, as well as
their willing participation in the genocide.124 Essentially, the exploitation
of the Jews was good business until the waning part of the War.' s
116. See id. at 252 (explaining the reasons for constructing the labor camps).
117. See id.
118. See id. at 253. By the end of the war there were 23 main concentration camps
that acted as centers for the distribution of slave laborers. See SLI'SON, supra note 26, at
90-91. There were an additional 1,000 feeder camps that were created by either German
companies or the SS. See id Krupp constructed 55 camps in the Essen area alone. See id.
Krupp employed its own guards at its camps and they made some laborers sleep in con-
struction materials. See id.
119. See id- at 254 (detailing the simplicity of the financial aspects of the camps).
120. See id. (articulating the deplorable conditions of the camps and the horrors en-
dured by Jews in the camps).
121. See 1 HMLBERG, supra note 42, at 254-55 (arguing that "private firms did not enter
into labor camps until 1942"); SumrsoN, supra note 26, at 85 (explaining that the Nazis
started to provide labor from the camps to the industrialists in 1942).
122. See 1 HLBERG, supra note 42, at 256 (recounting the industrialization of the
Warsaw ghetto).
123. See SmnisoN, supra note 26, at 68. When the extermination of Jews by gassing
started in earnest around 1942, it became clear to Western spy organizations that most of
the corporate executives knew about the exterminations. See id. at 81 (explaining how
Germany's industrialists not only knew about the Jewish genocide, but that they willingly
participated because it was good business). There is evidence that German industrialists
were made aware of the Jewish genocide by a select few corporate executives who were
disenchanted with the Nazi party and started feeding this information to West. See id. The
depiction of a visit to the Aushwitz camp by an executive of IG Farben serves as evidence
that the Holocaust was not a secret: "no one could have approached the IG Farben works
without becoming horribly, fearfully aware of what was happening nearby" because the
stench of burning flesh stuck in the air. Id. at 83.
124. See id. at 68 (discussing German reliance on organizations for the stability of
their economic and political structure).
125. See id. (stating that German big business, shopkeepers and professionals pros-
pered by using Jews).
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The forced labor programs were merely a link in the chain of the exter-
mination process.126 Concentration camp managers would order a la-
borer killed when he or she could work no longer."2 7 In 1943, so many
different companies were involved in the genocide that victims were
scarce." The boards of directors for Krupp, Siemens, Volkswagen, and
other companies started to meet with the SS in order to personally ask for
slave laborers.2 Among the industrialists who met with the SS were
Volkswagen's Ferdinand Porche and Siemen's Rudolf Bingel. 3 °
The SS was one of the main exploiters of slave labor and it demanded
literally the lives of their laborers.' 3' When companies moved into camps
like Auschwitz, camp managers adopted the SS manner of treating their
laborers. 32 The life expectancy of inmates in the hands of a private com-
pany was 3-4 months. 3
German based company, I.G. Farben, along with the Nazi government,
organized and built Auschwitz& '34 and was the first German company to
build factories in or around the concentration camp. 35 Farben became
126. See id. at 88 (explaining the system that the SS created to exploit Jews and others
while they killed them).
127. See 3 HnBERG, supra note 27, at 917 (recounting that captive laborers were kept
alive for construction or industrial projects, but later killed).
128. See id. at 934-35 (illustrating that the death of so many Jewish men created a
shortage in laborers which forced the use of women, children, and the elderly).
129. See SuMpsoN, supra note 26, at 85-86 (describing the personal account of these
meetings by Oswald Pohl, who was the SS officer in charge of their slave labor program).
130. See id. at 85-86 (stating that members of the board of directors at IG Farben,
Siemens, Krupp and Volkswagen sought large numbers of forced laborers).
131. See 3 HnILERG, supra note 27, at 922 (eiplaining the harsh working conditions
under which the SS made their laborers work). The SS's forced laborers were made to
work at a constant fast pace. See id. For example, sick, starved, and feeble workers had to
unload vegetables at a run. See id. At Krupp, guards used steel whips on the workers. See
PERsico, supra note 55, at 355 (recounting Speer's questioning at Nuremberg as to his visit
to Krupp).
132. See id. at 930 (recounting that at an I.G. Farben camp they welcomed their new
slave laborers by telling them that "[t]hey had come not in order to live there but to 'perish
in concrete."'). Laborers were forced to trot while carrying the concrete after they had
dug it up and if they could not work anymore they would be buried by concrete in the
holes that they had just dug, as were the ancient children of Israel. See id.
133. See id at 931 (referring to the life expectancy of inmates at I.G. Aushwitz).
134. See Chuck Ferree, supra note 25 (describing the deaths at Auschwitz). To Jews,
Aushwitz is the most notorious of all the Nazi concentration camps because it is where
approximately three million Jews were killed; therefore, at least 1/3 of all Jews who died in
the Holocaust died within the walls of Auschwitz. See id. My maternal grandfather was
from Krakow, Poland. He was one of the few members of his family to escape from the
Germans. Because Aushwitz was the death camp where Nazis sent Krakow Jews, to me,
Aushwitz represents the place where nearly 100 members of my family were killed.
135. See SiMPsoN, supra note 26, at 84-85 (explaining the German companies' gradual
involvement in Aushwitz).
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the expert on how to use concentration camp labor and became a consult-
ant to such companies as Volkswagen, Messerschmitt, Heinkel, and other
German companies.' 36 The German government further expanded the
camps in order to allow other companies to exploit their slaves' labor.137
In 1943, there were approximately 40,000 people being exploited by the
private German industry at Auschwitz.138 With few exceptions, every vi-
tal segment of Germany's economy was reliant on forced laborers by the
midpoint of WWII.139
Krupp, a metal works company which manufactured many of the weap-
ons the German Army used during WWJI, 14° built approximately one
hundred camps across Germany, Poland, Austria, France, and Czechoslo-
vakia wherein it conscripted forced labor.'41 Although Krupp produced
armaments, it also ordered its concentration camp laborers to build things
like railroad junctions, sheds, and washrooms.14 2 Yet, it never provided
its laborers with adequate rations, clothing, or shelter. 43 "Krupp consid-
ered it a duty to make 520 Jewish girls, some of them little more than
children, work under the most brutal conditions in the heart of the con-
cern, in Essen.""' The slaves were frequently beaten and kept in horren-
dous living conditions.' 45
136. See id. at 84 (exploring how Farben became known as the company which per-
fected the technique of integrating concentration camp labor).
137. See id at 85 (discussing a writing of Albert Speer which described the expansion
of concentration camps in order to allow more laborers to be exploited by industry).
138. See 3 HLBERG, supra note 27, at 933 (averaging the number of workers at
Aushwitz at any given time during WWII).
139. See SIMPsON, supra note 26, at 86 (emphasizing that "the initiative for these pro-
grams came from industry, not from the Nazi state"). Close to 20% of Germany's
workforce was made-up of forced laborers. See id. Some segments of industry relied on
these laborers to the extent of 60% of their workforce. See id. Anywhere from 5.3 to 8.1
million foreign laborers and prisoners of war were forced into slavery by Sauckel. See id.
at 86-87 (showing the labor figures of Sauckel's labor campaign). Another five million
Jews and Poles were forced into Germany's forced labor system. See id. at 87. Therefore, a
figure of 10 million forced laborers in Germany during WWIU is a conservative estimate.
140. See Ideas Make History, Increasing State Inten,ention (visited Feb. 4, 1999)<http'/
/www.krupp.comleng/histlhistlO.htm> (explaining the expansion of their production to
armaments).
141. See MANcrmsamr, supra note 45, at 492 (using estimates from Nuremberg's
records that survived the War).
142. See id. at 491 (describing how Rudolf H6ss, the SS commander of Auschwitz,
assigned laborers to Krupp).
143. See id. (explaining that adequate food, clothing, and shelter were lacking).
144. Id. at 10.
145. See id. at 493 (recounting the experiences of two technicians that worked for
Krupp, who intervened when the guards made an inmate hop to get around the factory).
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Of the sixteen plaintiffs in the Pollack lawsuit, two claim that they were
slaves for Krupp or one of its predecessor companies. 146  Richard
Friedemann, one of these plaintiffs, claims that Krupp forced him to work
with metal in horrendous heat that burned his flesh constantly while he
worked and was further burned by the asbestos clothing he was forced to
wear. 4 7 His complaint alleges he was beaten, sexually humiliated, and
was under the constant threat of being killed. 48
Siemens, another defendant, 49 served as a major electrical power sup-
plier during the war 50 and currently remains a large electrical conglom-
erate in Germany and throughout the world. 5' Siemens exploited slave
labor throughout the war 52 in such camps as Auschwitz, Ravensbruck,
Dachau, and Mauthausen.Y3 There are a number of documented occa-
sions where Siemens requested slave laborers from the SS.154 In 1943
and 1944, Rudolf H6ss, the head of the Aushwitz camp, testified at Nu-
remberg that Siemens received 2,700 women, who made electrical
switches for aircraft. 5 Siemens' use of slave labor was quite extensive,
however, and reached into several different Nazi camps.156
Helene Pollack, is one of four plaintiffs in the suit making claims
against Siemens. 57 She alleges that Siemens enslaved her at a labor
camp near Nuremberg, where she and her sisters were forced to make
146. See Class Action Complaint 3-12, Pollack v. Siemens AG, NO. 98CV-5499
(E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 30, 1998) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minor-
ity Issues) (stating that plaintiffs Richard Friedmann and Herman Sheppard were slaves for
Krupp AG, Hoeseh-Krupp and its predecessors).
147. See id at 4.
148. See id.
149. See id at 13.
150. See Lss TAN ST vEs, supra note 17, at 106 (stating Siemens provided electric-
ity to the concentration camps).
151. See Products & Solutions, Business Segments (visited Feb. 4, 1999)<http://
www.siemens.de/en/products-n-solutions/indexhtml> (listing the range of Siemen's
products).
152. See Lass TaN i SLAvFs, supra note 17, at 117 (quoting the History of the House
of Siemens).
153. See id. at XIX, Siemens was also involved with camps located in Flossberg, Sach-
senhausen, Buchenwald, and Gross Rosen. See id at 118
154. See id at 118-19 (describing the recorded use of slave laborers by Siemens).
155. See id. at 118.
156. See id. at 118-19 (reporting that Siemens employed slave laborers at several dif-
ferent sites and therefore utilized the services of various camps).
157. See Class Action Complaint 3-5, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499
(E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 30, 1998) (on file with The Scholar. St. Mary's Law Review on Minor-
ity Issues) (identifying the plaintiffs as having been forced to work in factories owned by
Siemens AG).
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bombs and munitions.' They regularly went without food, were often
beaten, and were made to wear wooden shoes without stockings even
though the camp was often freezing.'5 9
Volkswagen, the well known automobile manufacturer, started making
automobiles in 1934.16° They used slave labor from the Neuegamme,
Wolfsburg, and Fallerslben concentration camps.' 61 Plaintiff, Bernard
Roth alleges he was a slave laborer on a Volkswagen assembly line. 162
Mr. Roth claims he received little food, was forced to work in a factory
where the lack of ventilation made the factory brutally hot and where he
was harassed constantly."6
Defendant Heinkel, an aircraft manufacturer during WWII,'1 used la-
borers from Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Naatzwiller-Struthof,
Ravensbruck, and Sachsenhausen. 65 Plaintiff Jack Sittsarner alleges that
Heinkel and its predecessors conscripted him as a forced laborer for over
two and one-half years. 66 He was given nothing to eat during the day
and was under the constant fear that he would be killed if he made a
mistake while constructing aircraft.' r
BMW, now an automobile manufacturer, made airplane engines and
automobiles at the time of the war."6 The company used concentration
camp laborers from Buchenwald, Dachau, Naatzweiller-Struthof, and
158. See id at 3 (summarizing the turmoil that Ms. Pollack and her sisters faced in the
factories).
159. See id.
160. See VW World, VW History (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <httpJ//vlvw3.vw.com/vwworldl
thirty0l.htm> (tracing the history of Volkswagen and the production of what Germans
called "the peoples' car").
161. See Companies Affiliated With Concentration Camps (visited Feb. 5, 1999)<http.//
Nvww.remember.org/educatelcompanies.html> (listing the different companies' involve-
ment in the use of concentration camp labor).
162. See Class Action Complaint 9, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499 (E.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 30, 1998) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
163. See id.
164. See Luftvaffe Index (visited Feb. 5,1999) <http.//www.qt.org/worldwariluffwaffe/
luft3.html> (listing the aircraft of the Luftwaffe, the German Air Force). Heinkel made
the He 162, which was a fighter, and the He 111 and 177, which were bombers. See id.
165. See SMasoN, supra note 26, at 290-308 (tabulating "German companies and main
SS concentration camps reported to be active in exploitation of forced labor during the
Third Reich").
166. See Class Action Complaint 6, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499 (E.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 30, 1998) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
167. See id. at 6.
168. See Enterpris 80 Years of BMW (visited Feb. 5, 1999) <http'.//www.bmw.com/
bmwe/enterprise/heritage/history/history_3.shtml> (providing a history of BMW and listing
the different products made by BMW).
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Sachsenhausen. 169 Plaintiff Tibor Eisen alleges that BMW enslaved him
for a year and forced him to lug heavy bags filled with cement and
iron.17o
Daimler-Benz made automobiles during the War, but started produc-
ing war materials in 1942.'71 The company conscripted laborers from
Naatzweiler camp, which was housed underground, and the Sach-
senhausen 72 and Schirmeck concentration camps.173 The Pollack plain-
tiffs allege Daimler-Benz is the successor in interest to the companies
Telefunken, who used laborers from Gross-Rosen; AEG, who used labor-
ers from Stutthof and Riga-Kaiserwald; and Messerschmitt, who used la-
borers from Dachau, Flossenburg, and Mathausen.174 Specifically,
plaintiff Morris Newman alleges that Daimler-Benz forced him to work in
freezing conditions with no warm clothes. 75 Often, he was beaten and
had to carry heavy objects.1 76 He further alleges that he was only fed
bread and a concoction resembling soup. 1
77
"German industry destroyed at least three million foreign workers be-
tween 1942 and 1944 alone."'178
169. See SIMNSON, supra note 26, at 290-308 (listing all concentration camps operated
by the SS which held slave laborers).
170. See Class Action Complaint 7, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499 (E.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 30, 1998) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
171. See Destruction: The Year 1942, History (visited Feb. 5, 1999)
<wwwl.daimlerchrysler.com/history/epoche6history942..d..e.htm> (describing the rele-
vant history of the company). Daimler Benz acknowledges their role in slave labor on
their website. See Responsibility for the History of the Company, supra note 15. The com-
pany claims to have given, since the 1980's, 25 million Deutschmark to various groups that
support their former forced laborers, but they assert that individual compensation is not
possible. See id. Daimler Benz also claims to have supported the writing of two books
about the subject. The first is entitled DAMLER BENZ IN -m TI-mD REicH by NEIL GR-
GOR and the second, FORCED LABOR AT DAnILER BENz by HANs POHL ET" AL. See id.;
Scholarly Assessment (visited Feb. 5, 1999) <http:llwww.dainler-benz.comlspecials/Swangsl
zwarb2.e.htm>.
172. See SIMpsoN, supra note 26, at 290-308 (noting which concentration camps were
operated by the SS, while holding slave laborers for the companies).
173. See Companies Affiliated With Concentration Camps, supra note 161 (listing dif-
ferent companies which used concentration camps for their production).
174. See Class Action Complaint -7-12, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499
(E.D.N.Y. filed on Aug. 30, 1998) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on
Minority Issues).
175. See id. at 7-8.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. SIMPsON, supra note 26, at 90.
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E. Post World War I1
1. Reparations
After WWII, the West German government acknowledged their crimes
and pledged to pay Israel for Germany's crimes against the Jewish peo-
ple.179 Since then, West Germany has paid billions of Deutschmark in
reparations,18 including payments to Israel for the influx of Jewish refu-
gees after WWJI. 181 The West German effort included the creation of a
pension program in 1953 for more than 500,000 Holocaust survivors.la 2
From 1953 to 1997, its total cost to the West German government was
over $58 billion. 8 3 Eyebrows were raised regarding the German govern-
ment's pension program to holocaust survivors, however, because it was
less substantial than funds pledged to German World War H veterans.184
What made the disparity so offensive was that some of the VWII veter-
ans were Nazi SS officers that helped perpetrate the Holocaust.las
The German government was not the only party prosecuted for crimes
against Jews and others during the war; several lawyers after the Nurem-
179. See Lorraine Adams, The Reckoning, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1997, at W8 (stating
that "Germany provides the money, but it is a Jewish group the Conference on Jewish
Material Claims Against Germany that must decide which Holocaust survivors receive rep-
arations, and which do not").
180. See Financial Aid, Years of Committed Indirect Help (visited Feb. 5, 1999) <http://
wvww.daimler-benz.com/speeialslzwangslzwarb4_e.htm> (examining "[t]he possibility of in-
dividual compensation for forced laborers," but ruling it out because of problems with the
practicalities of such a program).
181. See 3 HUBERG, supra note 27, at 1177-78 (describing the good-will of the West
German government after negotiations failed with the Allies).
182. See Adams, supra note 179 (explaining how the WVest Germans have paid pen-
sions for over 40 years and are now thinking about the future when they do not have to pay
them anymore). There have been three categories of pension programs to Holocaust survi-
vors. See id. The first plan was started in 1952 and stopped accepting applications in 1965.
See id. It was the largest of all the reparation groups and paid out to around 280,000
survivors. See id. At first, this pension was sufficient, but now it has been cut down. See
id. The second plan, which is still accepting applicants, was started in 1980 as a response to
the influx of refugees to the United States and Israel from East Germany, and paid out a
one time reparation of about $3,000. See id The third plan started in 1993 and covered
about 38,000 people. See id. About $757 million was set aside for the plan. See id. There
are additional programs like the Hugo Princz pension plan for American citizens who were
forced into concentration camps and programs to redistribute property to survivors. See
id The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, which distributes all of
the funds given by Germany to survivors in the manner they see fit, has been sharply
criticized. See id As funds have become scarcer some people have been declined money
from the pensions administered by the Conference. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
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berg trials took action against companies like Krupp and I.G. Farben. 186
Nevertheless, even when the German government sought to pay compen-
sation, the compensation did not include repayment for slave labor
claims."8 The government refused to take any responsibility for private
companies' actions or crimes.' 88 Subsequent to this pronouncement by
the German government, several lawsuits were filed in Germany against
companies in the 1950's and 1960's."89 Unfortunately, German courts did
not want to participate in lawsuits against such companies. 190 With the
few exceptions listed below, the victims of the slave labor camps were not
compensated by the companies which had enslaved them during the
War.'91
I.G. Farben made select reparations in the early 1950's to certain survi-
vors in the amount of $1,200 per survivor." At the same time, a lawyer
named Benjamin Ferencz began to pressure Krupp for similar compensa-
tion." Under the German law of the time, anyone convicted under a
criminal statute could be liable for civil redress to the victims.194 Because
the head of Krupp was convicted at the Nuremberg trials for his criminal
actions, Ferencz, thought redress for Krupp's victims would be an easy
task.' 95 It was not.196 Krupp fought every step of the way and even, at
186. See MANCHESTER, supra note 45, at 790 (theorizing that since Krupp and others
were found guilty under criminal law at Nuremberg, they should also be liable under civil
law).
187. See Luss THAN SLAvEs, supra note 17, at xvii (clarifying that the West German
government did pay reparations to survivors, but none of these reparations was in compen-
sation for the labor of any survivors).
188. See id. (concluding that there was a gap in the reparations program regarding
compensation for the labor performed by the forced laborers).
189. See id. at xx (describing how former survivors did not want to rely on the Ger-
man government so they took their claims to German courts).
190. See id. at xxi (recounting how "German courts made it clear that this was one
problem they would rather avoid than resolve."). Subsequently, the former laborers lost
resolve to continue their actions in German courts. See id.
191. See id. There were five agreements made between former slave laborers and the
companies. See 3 HhLBERG, supra note 27, at 1172 (summarizing the information from
Benjamin B. Ferencz's book, LEss T-AN SL.AvEs). The companies that made these agree-
ments were Farben, Krupp, AEG, Siemens, and Rheinmetall. See id.
192. See MANcHEStR, supra note 45, at 789 (discussing Ferencz's appeals to German
companies for compensation).
193. See id.
194. See id. at 790 (explaining that since the West German government had adopted
the Nuremberg verdicts, Krupp was a criminal and, therefore, subject to criminal liability).
195. See id.
196. See id. (pointing out. that if Krupp was forced to pay Jews for their labor, then
non-Jews would also assert claims against the corporation thus causing the damages to rise
to an estimated $50 million).
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times, made anti-Semitic comments in negotiations." 9 Krupp stalled in
order to let lawsuits against other German corporations play their course
and see what precedent they set.198 The company also took advantage of
the time it would take for a lawsuit to go through the German legal sys-
tem. 19 9 Additionally, survivors were reluctant to bring suits in Germany
because they did not want to rely on German lawyers. t 0
As a war criminal, Alfried Krupp was forced by the Allies to sell his
German metal interests." I Therefore, Krupp was trying to acquire inter-
ests in countries outside of Germany, with the United States being one of
those countries.2 2 Ferencz and other lawyers seeking reparations used
the threat of a class action suit against Krupp in the United States to their
advantage.2 ' 3 And, in 1959, an agreement with Krupp became a real-
ity.2" 4 Krupp finally paid a lump sum settlement to the survivors of some
of their camps.2 " Due to low estimates of the number of survivors, how-
ever, the settlement was inadequate to pay off all the survivors. 6 When
the funds were exhausted, Krupp implied the Jewish claimants were
greedy.20 7
In 1946, Hermann von Siemens testified in a lawsuit against his com-
pany that, in fact, the company did conscript labor, but that in no way did
any of the laborers get mistreatedV0  The Jewish Claims Conference
learned in 1960 that Siemens made a report about its use of forced labor-
ers shortly after the war. 3 9 Because of Adolf Eichmann's trial in Israel
in 1960 and Siemens' entrance into the U.S. market, a resurgence of inter-
197. See id. at 790-91.
198. See Lrass Trsa SLAE s, supra note 17, at 79 ("If the claimants were defeated in
the other cases, precedent could provide Krupp with an impenetrable legal shield.").
199. See id at 81 (explaining that an agreement could be good for both sides because
a humanitarian gesture would make Krupp look good and there would not be a long drawn
out court case that the survivors would have to endure).
200. See id at xvii (explaining how Jewish claimants wanted to rely on a legal aid
society rather than bringing claims in Germany).
201. See id. at 79.
202. See id. at 79-80 (explaining how Krupp's business all over the world was priori-
tized over dealing with their slave labor problem).
203. See id. at 84-85 (discussing the business Krupp was conducting with Chase Man-
hattan Bank and the possibility of a civil suit).
204. See MANcHEsTR, supra note 45, at 791.
205. See id.
206. See id at 792 (recounting how laborers who received payments from Krupp re-
ceived around $750).
207. See id at 792-93 (discussing the appeals for supplemental funds when it surfaced
that the parties had underestimated the amount of parties).
208. See Lass THAN SI.Avas, supra note 17, at 117 (noting that Herman von Siemens
was aware of the use of slave laborers by his company).
209. See id. at 119.
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est in Siemens' involvement occurred.21° When lawyers approached the
company about compensation, the company refused to present the re-
port.211 Siemens' legal representatives were surprised with the prospect
of having to compensate their laborers.212 Notwithstanding, in 1961, the
report surfaced after much haggling with the company for a settlement.213
Siemens agreed to a settlement, but like the Krupp agreement, it had
severe drawbacks.214 The first line of the contract explained that Siemens
was making the payments not because it had "moral obligations," but
because they had "moral contemplations." 215 The contract called for a
fund that, at the time, was the equivalent of $1,250,000.216 An auditor,
appointed by both the Jewish groups and the company, would have to
approve each application made by a survivor.2 17 Consequently, of the
6,000 claimants that applied for redress, only a third received payment.218
When the research to determine who was a slave laborer was completed,
each successful applicant received 3,300 Deutschmark or $825.219
Unlike previous lawsuits, in days just after the Pollack lawsuit was
filed, the German government urged the companies not to settle.220
However, two notable funds were offered to former slave laborers.2 1
Volkswagen and Siemens started pension plans of around $12 million
each.r' In addition, several proposals were made for the creation of a
fund, into which an estimated 79 German companies could contribute.'
210. See id at 119-20.
211. See id. at 119.
212. See id.
213. See id at 119-20 (explaining that finding the report was important to the negotia-
tion process).
214. See LEss THAN SLAVES, supra note 17, at 121-22 (describing the difficulty in
reaching a final settlement agreement). Siemens, at one time, even excused its actions by
stating that it "could not avoid the employment of concentration camp inmates and had
done everything in its power to alleviate the suffering of the slave laborers." Id.
215. See id at 121.
216. See id. at 122.
217. See id
218. See id.
219. See id at 127 (observing that the claimants who had toiled for Siemens made
their claims from countries all over the world, but in the end they received so little from
the company that caused them so much pain).
220. See Imre Karacs, German Firms Count Costs of Slave Labor, INDpEnNnNT -
LONDON, Nov. 9, 1997, at 15 (describing the German government's stance as having to
draw the line somewhere).
221. See Yojana Sharma, Minorities-Germany: Gypsies Seek World War II Recom-
pense, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 24, 1998, available in 1998 WL 19900638 (explaining
how Gypsies are considering their compensation claims against Germany).
222. See id. (reporting that Volkswagen will consider claims on an individual basis).
223. See id (reporting a possible fund for Jews, Gypsies, and other aggrieved groups
of WWII).
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In February of 1999, meetings between representatives of German in-
dustry and government, Jewish groups, and plaintiffs' lawyers started so-
lidifying a plan to create a general fund into which German companies
could contribute monies.' On February 16, 1999 the plan was an-
nounced.'-- The participants in the fund stated that the fund should total
between $3.5 to $4.6 billion and the total recipients will be between
200,000 to 300,000 people worldwide. 2- Several companies, which or-
ganizers expect should join the fund, have not decided if they want to be
involved.''- Yet, Ed Fagan, attorney for the plaintiffs in Pollack, said in
an interview that he will continue the actions against the companies, un-
less more companies make contributions, because he feels that the plan,
as is, is inadequate.' 2s The fund is meant to go into effect on September
1, 1999.229
2. Holocaust Claims
Fishel v. BASF Group"° and Hugo Princz's story'3p each, in their own
way, add insight to the Pollack lawsuit. The Fishel case is the most similar
to the Pollack case with respect to facts; it was the first true Holocaust
slave labor case. 3 2 Although, the plaintiff was not successful in an Iowa
federal court, there could be a very different result in a New York federal
court where the Second Circuit has made some enlightened decisions in
the past 20 years regarding international human rights3l Additionally,
224. See German Official to Push Holocaust Reparations Plan, supra note 14 (noting
that Holocaust survivors, senior German officials, World Jewish Congress officials, and
Deutsche Bank officials are parties to the plan).
225. See Czuczka, supra note 9 (reporting the creation of a fund by German compa-
nies like Deutsche Bank, Daimler-Benz, DaimlerChrysler, and Siemens).
226. See id. (quoting Bodo Homback, Schroeder's chief of staff).
227. See Nelan, supra note 15.
228. See Dateline NBC supra note 41.
229. See Nelan, supra note 15.
230. 175 F.R.D. 525, 527 (S.D. Iowa 1997).
231. See Sumathi Reddy, Prisoners of Memories, THE PROVIDmENC SuNDAY J., Sept.
28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13860869 (explaining Holocaust survivor Hugo Princ's
forty year fight for reparation)
232. Compare Fishel v. BASF Group, 175 F.R.D. 525, 527-28 (S.D. Iowa 1997)
(describing the plaintiff's claims against certain German corporations because they alleg-
edly enslaved him), with Class Action Complaint 1-2 Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-
5499 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 30, 1998) (on file with The Scholar SL Mary's Law Review on
Minority Issues) (stating that the "[d]efendants conspired with the Nazi Regime and other
un-named German industrial entities to use Holocaust victims as slave laborers, and illic-
itly profited from such forced labor").
233. Compare Holocaust Lawsuit Thrown Out Judge Rules Federal Court Lacks Juris-
diction in Survivor's Case, ONAHA WoRim-Hn-RALD, Mar. 17, 1998, at 13 (quoting the
judge as saying that there is no evidence that the companies sell their products in a system-
atic manner in Iowa), with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.22 (2d Cir. 1980)
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the Princz case should serve as -the inspiration for human rights claimants
to bring their cases. It shows that victims can get compensation and an
admission of responsibility from their oppressors, even after forty years
of fighting for justice.3 4
a. The Fishel Case
The plaintiff in Fishel v. BASF Group was a slave laborer during the
Holocaust, thereby making Fishel a close cousin to the Pollack case.3
Fishel, decided in March of 1997, is believed to be first of the Holocaust
slave labor casesP16 In that case, David Fishel alleged that the defendant
corporations should be responsible for paying damages because they
forced him into slavery during the Holocaust. 37 The defendant corpora-
tions included not only I.G. Farben and its descendant corporations
BASF, Hoechst, and Bayer, but also Mercedes-Benz, and Krupp.83
Fishel brought suit in federal district court in Iowa.3 9 The companies
challenged the lawsuit with a number of different theories. First, the de-
fendants alleged the present day or post-war companies are different in
form from the Nazi era companies because the post-war companies were
newly created after the Second World War.24 ° Second, the companies
challenged the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction?24 Finally, the defend-
(noting that the court may have jurisdiction over a torture claim in violation of interna-
tional law under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)), and Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,236 (2d Cir.
1995) (granting jurisdiction for violations of international law).
234. See Tom Tugend, U.S. Survivors of Nazi Camps can get German Compensation,
JEwisH TELEGRAPmC AGENCY, June 17, 1996, at 2 (stating that Prinez sought reparations
from the German and U.S. governments for 40 years).
235. See Fishel v. BASF Group, 175 F.R.D. 525, 527 (S.D. Iowa 1997).
236. See Jeff Zeleny, Labor Victim Suing German Firms, DEs Monms REo., Aug. 10,
1997, at 1.
237. See Fishel, 175 F.RtD. at 527.
238. See id
239. See id
240. See id This argument shows shortsightedness and ignorance of post-war occur-
rences; it also appeals to common thought about these occurrences. See Neil H. Weinfield
et. al., Letters to the Editor: VW and the Sins of the Fathers, WALL ST. J. EUROPn, Sept. 29,
1998, available in 1998 WL 2732750. The reputation of the German firms were still intact
after the war. See iL When the Allies relinquished the companies back to their German
owners in 1950, the owners kept the pre-war names of the firms because of their reputa-
tions. See id However, keeping those names intact throughout the war was done on the
backs of slave laborers who never were compensated. See id, The argument that a success-
ful claim would be punishing the innocent sons of the companies that actually committed
the horrors is misleading. German manufacturers talk proudly about their history, yet they
would never mention that the company that built beautiful cars before WWII is different
from the present day company. That would be bad for nostalgia and probably new news to
present day investors of the companies' stock and vintage automobiles.
241. See Fishel, 175 F.R.D. at 527.
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ants made a statute of limitations challenge alleging that the plaintiffs
cause of action had tolled because 50 years had passed since the occur-
rences alleged.242
District Court Judge Longstaff dismissed the case citing statute of limi-
tations and jurisdictional issues as a bar to the suit.243 Judge Longstaff
held "'[t]here is no evidence any defendant maintains an office, employ-
ees or agents, bank accounts or registered agents in Iowa... [n]or do any
of the defendants themselves systematically sell their products in
Iowa."' 2"
b. The Hugo Princz Case
The Princz case illustrates some of the significant legal barriers a
human rights claimant faces. Hugo Princz fought two governments for
over 40 years to obtain compensation for his experiences during World
War IT245 Princz, who was born to an American businessman, was living
in Europe at the time World War II erupted.246 Although he was born in
Europe, he was a United States citizen because of his father's national-
ity.247 The Nazis imprisoned Princz and his entire family; everyone in his
family was killed during the Holocaust except for Princz. 248
In 1955, when Princz applied for the German pension plan paid to Hol-
ocaust survivors, Princz did not meet the criteria because he was not a
German citizen or a refugee.249 Again, in 1984, when Princz renewed his
request for reparations from the German government, I.G. Farben, and
Messerschmidt, Princz was denied reparations by the German govern-
ment." ° After his second denial there were several failed diplomatic ap-
peals by the U.S. government"z 1 In 1992 Princz initiated a lengthy
242. See id. (alleging that the claims were barred by the statutes of limitations).
243. See Holocaust Lawsuit Thrown Out Judge Rules Federal Court Lacks Jurisdiction
in Survivors, OAHA WoxtD-HERAL, Mar. 17, 1998, at 13 (describing how the Judge
agreed with defense attorneys' arguments that the suit should be dismissed).
244. Id.
245. See Tugend, supra note 234 (detailing the Holocaust Claims Program which al-
lows U.S. Holocaust survivors to file claims with the U.S. Department of Justice).
246. See id. (stating that Mr. Princz was a U.S. citizen when he was imprisoned by the
Nazis).
247. See id. (explaining that Princz was born to a naturalized American citizen which
made him a U.S. citizen).
248. See id. (recounting how Princez's parents and six siblings died in Nazi camps).
249. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(stating that the German government denied Mr. Princz reparations' claim in 1955).
250. See id. (describing the method in which Mr. Princz, the United States Depart-
ment of State and New Jersey congressional members brought actions against the German
government and I.G. Farben in 1984).
251. See id. (explaining how the United States Department of State joined Mr. Princz
in a series of diplomatic appeals that failed).
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litigation process which culminated in the dismissal of his case because
Princz's actions during World War II did not directly affect the United
States, therefore the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) barred
the action. 2
After FSIA was deemed a bar to Princz's lawsuit, his lawyers changed
their tactics and turned to the media and to Congress for help with
Princz's case.' 3 President Clinton put pressure on the German govern-
ment to make an agreement." 4 In June of 1996, the two governments
came to a settlement agreement2 55 The agreement settled ten victims'
cases including Princz's.2 6 The parties included in the settlement were
all U.S. citizens during World War H.3 More victims that fit this de-
scription, including U.S. soldiers, were given reparations in a subsequent
agreement made in 1997.1 s
Ill. BARRIBRS THm POLLACK PLAINT S FACE IN BRNGING THEmIR
CASE TO TRiLu
A. Introduction
Holocaust claims and other types of human rights litigation face several
barriers. The first barrier is jurisdiction. There are two types of jurisdic-
tion, subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, both of which
play a role in a human rights defendants' plan to derail a case. Before I
focus on these two principals, I discuss the Second Circuit's jurisprudence
starting with Filartiga, a landmark human rights case, which shows the
circuit is ripe for more human rights litigation because of its recent rul-
ings in the area of jurisdiction. Additionally, there are two pre-trial mo-
tions that may bar plaintiffs from continuing their claims. These pre-trial
motions are based upon the formalities of a statute of limitations and the
principle of forum non conveniens- 9
252. See id.
253. See Marilyn H. Karfeld, Forgotten Holocaust Victims Will Finally Receive Justice.
U.S. Citizens Interned in Concentration Camps to Get Compensation from Germany, CLRV.
JEwisH NEws, Nov. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11590040.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See, eg., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing The Tor-
ture Victim Act as having a ten year statute of limitation). See also Boyd, supra note 19, at
58 (describing forum non conveniens as a significant bar to litigation in human rights cases
in the United States and reasoning why this doctrine should be abolished in such cases).
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B. The Second Circuit: Filartiga and its 'Progeny
In 1980 the Second Circuit decided the landmark case Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala.260 This decision was the first case in which a United States
court recognized international human rights standards while trying to
remedy an injustice that occurred in a foreign country." 1 The parties had
no ties to this country at the time the cause of action accrued. 2m
The Filartiga case was spawned by the actions of a Paraguayan offi-
cial. 63 The plaintiffs Joel and Dolly Filartiga were citizens of the Repub-
lic of Paraguay and long time vocal opponents of the Paraguayan
government which was in power during the 1970's. 4 In an attempt to
gain information on Dr. Filartiga's political activities, a high ranking po-
lice official, Am6rico Pena-Irala, kidnapped, sadistically tortured, and
killed Dr. Filartiga's seventeen-year old son, Joelito36 5
Using a visitor's visa, Pena entered the United States in 1978, but
stayed past the terms set out in the visa.266 Dolly Filartiga, living in
Washington D.C. at the time, discovered Pena was in the United
States.26 7 Subsequently, the Filartigas served Pena with a civil complaint
for wrongful death while Pena was waiting to be deported.23
Judge Nickerson, the district court judge, dismissed the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, but the decision was appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.269 There was an overwhelming
response to the case in the media and numerous amicus curiae briefs
260. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Ctr. 1980) (recognizing the
court's decision as a "small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to
free all people from brutal violence"); see also HuNtAN RMGHrs iN THE WoRLD Co.%%tu-
NrrY, supra note 23, at 295 (discussing the importance of Filartiga to human rights enforce-
ment in the United Sates).
261. See HumtAN PiGHrrs IN TmE Wou.n CoziuNmrry, supra note 23, at 295 (explain-
ing that traditionally the judicial branch of the government does not venture into interna-
tional human rights law because this area is usually left to the legislative or executive
branches). The executive branch and the legislative branch, however, are usually too con-
strained by politics to make a difference in the area of human rights. See id
262. See id
263. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (describing the facts of the case).
264. See id
265. See id.; HumAN Ri.Glrs IN Tm WoR.D CoN tuNrr, supra note 23, at 329-30
(detailing the facts of the Filartiga case).
266. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878-79.
267. See id.
268. See id at 879.
269. See HuMtAN RiGHrs iN -m WomRm Cobmtinrry, supra note 23 at 332 (describ-
ing the litigation between Pena and the Filartigas).
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were filed with the court.27 The Second Circuit ruled that torture was a
violation of international law, thereby invoking the court's jurisdiction.271
The case was remanded to Judge Nickerson's court and the Filartigas won
a ten million dollar judgment27 which would remain unpaid. By that
time, Pena had been deported.273
In Filartiga, the plaintiffs based their jurisdiction on the Alien Tort
Statute.274 Under Section 1350, a court has jurisdiction when an alien to
the United States brings an action in tort that violates "the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States."275 Interpreting other judges' writings as
well as "the customs and usages of civilized nations,"2 76 the Filartiga
court recognized torture as a violation of international law.277 The court
ruled that torture perpetrated by a country on its own citizens is of inter-
national concern and provides jurisdiction to U.S. courts.278
In 1995, the Second Circuit reinforced Filartiga in Kadic v. Karadzic by
extending the Filartiga doctrine's reach.279 Kadic held that violators of
international law include those acting under the power of a government
and also private citizens acting in their individual capacity.280 In addition,
the court listed other potential violations of international law: (1) slav-
ery, (2) piracy, (3) genocide, (4) war crimes, and (5) "other instances of
inflicting death, torture, and degrading treatment."281 These crimes are
so heinous, the court ruled, that they are of "universal concern" and "per-
mits states to establish appropriaie civil remedies."'
270. See id. at 333 (recounting how some well known legal writers have rebutted the
notion that "problems arising under the international law of human rights may not be dealt
with by domestic courts").
271. See F'lartiga, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (granting original jurisdiction based on the Alien
Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1998)).
272. See Human Rights in the World Community, supra note 23, at 336.
273. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
274. See id. at 878"(ruling that "whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with
process by an alien within our borders, Section 1350 provides federal jurisdiction").
275. The Alien Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
276. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (describing when it is appropriate to resort to cus-
tomary international law).
277. See id. at 884 (deciding that in fact a state can not violate its own citizens' human
rights).
278. See id. at 881-90 (explaining that every country officially decries torture and since
torture is universally outlawed it is a crime with universal jurisdiction).
279. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Filartiga).
280. See id. at 239 (addressing several United States Supreme Court cases which have
applied international law concepts proscribing slavery to private citizens).
281. See id. at 240.41 (analyzing various international treaties that generally describe
crimes against humanity).
282. See id.
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Kadic is set against the backdrop of the atrocities that have occurred in
the former Yugoslav Republic. The plaintiffs, who are Croat and Mus-
lim citizens, alleged that Karadzic, the President of the Bosnian-Serb Re-
public, ordered his forces to commit such atrocities as rape, torture, and
summary execution." Karadzic was served a summons while in the
United States on United Nations business. The court ruled that the
atrocities alleged by the plaintiffs, even if committed by private individu-
als, were violations of international law and thus invoked the jurisdiction
of the district court." 6
Because none of the plaintiffs in Pollack are aliens to the United
States,' however, they are unable to sue under the Alien Tort Statute.
Nevertheless, United States citizens should be able to bring claims for
violations of their human rights under another set of statutes. In Pollack,
the plaintiffs have based jurisdiction on the federal question statute and
the diversity of citizenship statute.' In dicta, Filartiga and Karadzic sug-
gested that their reasoning could be used to uphold jurisdiction under the
general federal question statute, the Second Circuit has not ruled on the
issue.289
283. See iL at 236 (illustrating the facts of the case).
284. See id.
285. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 237.
286. See id. at 241-43 (outlining the progression of outlawing crimes against
humanity).
287. See Alien Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) (limiting the district court's
jurisdiction to cases brought by aliens). American citizens cannot sue under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350. See id. However, other parts of the code provide viable alternatives for the Pollack
plaintiffs assertion of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (giving district courts juris-
diction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, law.s, or treaties of the United
States"); see also Anthony D'Amato, Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations is Seri-
ously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L 92, 98 (1985) (criticizing Judge Bork's concurring opin-
ion in Tel-Oren as overbroad and as posing the threat of "%viping] out the invocation of
customary international law in American courts").
288. See Class Action Complaint 2, Pollack v. Siemens AG, NO. 98CV-5499
(E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 30,1998) (on fie with The Scholar St. Mary's Law Review on Minor-
ity Issues).
289. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the court
recognizes the possibility of Section 1331 jurisdiction, but because Section 1350 provides a
remedy the court does not need to rule on Section 1331 jurisdiction); Fartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.22 (2d Cir. 1980) (realizing that the court could exercise jurisdic-
tion under Section 1331).
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C. Jurisdictional Issues
The jurisdiction issue is the threshold question in any human rights
claim"z 0 The term jurisdiction "refers to a state's legitimate assertion of
authority to affect legal interests."29 Both types of jurisdiction, personal
and subject matter, are likely to be at issue in a human rights case. For
example, in cases similar to Pollack, defendants have filed motions for
summary judgement stating that the court lacks jurisdiction over the case
and the parties.2 92
Personal jurisdiction has been defined as the court's "power to render a
judgment against [a] particular defendant."'293 On the other hand, subject
matter jurisdiction is the court's power to "hear a particular dispute. 294
Congress has enacted a number of statutes which establish the federal
district and intermediate appellate courts' subject matter jurisdiction 2 9
The following arguments for invoking jurisdiction in the Pollack case are
intended to be a model for any human rights case.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The plaintiff class in the Pollack case have plead subject matter jurisdic-
tion under Title 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 and 1332(a).2 96 The following
discussion first focuses on subject matter jurisdiction arising under Sec-
tion 1331 and second discusses subject matter jurisdiction under Section
1332(a).
290. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73
Mnm. L. REv. 349,355-56 (1988) [hereinafter Randall, Federal Questions] (suggesting that
a "human rights litigant must allege an adequate statutory basis for federal subject matter
jurisdiction" and that Section 1331 provides an alternative to claimants because of the judi-
ciary's confining interpretations of other sections in Title 28).
291. See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 Tax.
L. Rav. 785, 786 (1988) [hereinafter Randall, Universal Jurisdiction].
292. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (writing that the
defendant filed motions to dismiss for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing how the district court
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub-
lic, 726 F.2d 774,775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (deciding that the district court properly
held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction); Fishel v. BASF Group, 175 F.R.D. 525, 527
(S.D. Iowa 1997) (stating that the defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of
personal jurisdiction).
293. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CrvIL PROCEDURE 12 (1996) (instructing that defendants
can only be brought within the power of a court if there is personal jurisdiction).
294. Id. at 6 (splitting subject matter jurisdiction into two categories, general and
limited).
295. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1331-1332 (1994) (outlining the jurisdictional require-
ments for the courts of appeals and the district courts).
296. See Class Action Complaint 2, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499 (E.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 30, 1998) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
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a. 28 U.S.C. § 1331
The federal question statute, Section 1331, furnishes district courts with
jurisdiction in "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." 97 Two possible avenues for jurisdiction in
the Pollack suit emanate from Section 1331's language: the terms "trea-
ties" and "laws.""29 There are two essential questions when determining
whether international standards of human rights give rise to a personal
cause of action under either the "treaties" language or the "laws" lan-
guage. The first, is whether the cause of action alleged would be a viola-
tion of international human rights standards. 9 The second, is whether a
private right to a cause of action arises from these standards. 00 The
"treaties" language and the "laws" language of Section 1331 may give rise
to a private cause of action for a Pollack human rights claim against the
named defendants.
i. The "Treaty" Language
Under the "treaties" language analysis, the first question is whether the
Pollack defendants violated a treaty to which the United States was a
party.30' In order to prevent the retroactive application of international
law in human rights cases under Section 1331, the court must look to the
concepts of international law at the time of the alleged violation .31
The precedent provided by the Nuremberg Trials shows that the Pol-
lack defendants violated international law as it was at the time of
297. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
298. See Randall, Federal Questions, supra note 290, at 349, 376-77, 394-95, 406-07
(describing federal case law that supports a claimant's cause of action under Section 1331
on either a laws theory or a treaties theory).
299. See id at 394 (asking whether "international law, as accepted by the United
States, recognizes the human rights of the plaintiff allegedly violated by the defendant").
300. See id. at 441 (describing that in order to find a cause of action for apartheid, a
federal judge would have to interpret the Apartheid Convention as part of United States'
customary law and then "derive a private cause of action from that customary law").
301. See id. at 394 (asking how a cause of action under positive international law
arises). If a defendant violated an international law agreed to by the United States then
the plaintiffs should be able to invoke Section 1331 jurisdiction. See id.
302. See Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials of German Industrialsts. The "Other
Schindlers," 9 Tm m,. Irrr'a. & CoMp. LJ. 173, 249 (1995) (stating that the court must look
at the circumstances as they appeared to the defendants at the time of the alleged criminal
activity). One could argue that under international law, human rights violators could be
held accountable under present international law concepts rather than those in effect when
the defendant allegedly violated these laws. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
881 (2d Cir. 1980). In Filartiga, the court held that "courts must interpret international law
not as it was ... but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today." Id.
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WWII.3 °3 A case in point would be the Allies' prosecution of Alfried
Krupp on charges of crimes against peace, spoliation and plunder, and
slave labor.3" 4 Because of the way Krupp conscripted laborers, the Nu-
remberg court ruled that he had violated Article 52 of the Hague Con-
vention.30 5 Article 52 allows a conquering power to demand the services
of the people inhabiting the area "so long as such obligations are in-
tended to meet the 'needs of the army of occupation,' are in 'proportion
to the resources of the country,' and do not involve the inhabitants in the
obligation to take part in military operations against their own
country." 30
6
The Nuremberg Court ruled that Krupp's actions clearly violated inter-
national law at the time because his company required its laborers to
build equipment that was furthering the war effort and their enslave-
ment.30 7 By convicting individual violators of international law, the Al-
lies "extended personal liability under international law to private
individuals as well as to public officials." 308 The Second Circuit reaf-
firmed the Nuremberg principles by recognizing a private right of action
under international law.309 A civil suit for damages like the Pollack case
would be a natural extension of the Nuremberg trials; a suit such as this
would be awarding the plaintiffs damages they deserve and, at the same
time, strengthening the precedent set by Nuremberg.310
Still left unanswered, however, is whether the "treaty" language of Sec-
tion 1331 can provide for a private cause of action. The D.C. Circuit held
that international laws do not give private individuals a cause of action in
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.311 The plaintiffs in Tel-Oren brought
303. When Germany surrendered in 1945, the Allies, including England, France, the
United States, and Russia, established a procedure for trying the Nazis war criminals.
Crimes against humanity and crimes against the peace were two of the counts for which
one could be tried as a war criminal. See Ramasastry, supra note 32, at 395.
304. See Lippman, supra note 302, at 232-39 (illustrating the various charges against
Krupp and its officials).
305. See id. at 247-48 (noting how the Tribunal decided that Krupp's use of labor
violated all standards of human decency).
306. See Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting the
Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,1907, art. 52,36 Stat. 2277,2308 (mandating in
Article 52 that an invading army can not make requisitions on local communities).
307. See Lippman, supra note 302, at 248 (describing that the tribunal found Krupp's
behavior disregarded the "standards of decency and humanity").
308. See id. at 249 (reviewing the doctrinal developments set by Nuremberg).
309. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that since WWI
private individuals can be held liable for committing war crimes).
310. See Dateline NBC, supra note 41 (quoting Ed Fagan's reasoning for why the Pol-
lack plaintiffs should go to trial and not settle).
311. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (stating that of all the treaties plead by the plaintiffs, the defendants
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their claim under both Section 1331 and Section 1350, but it was dis-
missed by the trial court for lack of jurisdiction. 1" On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit Court upheld the dismissal.3? ' In his concurring opinion, Judge
Bork argued that for a treaty to provide a private cause of action, the
treaty would have to directly state that it is self-executing.314 Yet, the
Court's decision to ignore Filartiga's recognition of private causes of ac-
tion arising from international law has been criticized by
commentators. 315
Judge Bork's main fear was that all non-self-executing treaties would
become self-executing under Section 1350.16 This, however, is not possi-
ble. An example of two types of treaties will clarify this problem.317 An
example of a non-self-executing treaty would be an agreement between
two nations that regulates the import and export of a product between
the two countries.31 If the treaty is somehow violated, an individual
would not have a private cause of action under international law, because
the individual is not hurt directly by the violation; only the economy in
violated only five of the treaties which are binding on the United States and none of these
five provide a private cause of action). Judge Bork suggests that the five binding treaties
are not self-executing because they are meant to be agreements binding on states to pass
specific legislation for specific purposes. See id. In 1978, members from the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) landed in Israel and took over a tourist bus with citizens
from Israel, the United States, and the Netherlands. See id. at 776. By the time the Israeli
police took control of the situation, 34 tourists were dead. See id. The victims filed suit in
the D.C. district court; however, the district court judge dismissed the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 776.
312- See id. (reporting that the court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
313. See id. at 775.
314. See id. at 808-10 (arguing that the federal court system should not activate trea-
ties for private action because this would cause the court system to be inundated with
lawsuits after a war). Cf Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1544 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(finding that litigants should be allowed a cause of action under Title 28, Section 1350 for
certain "international common law torts").
315. See, eg., D'Amato, supra note 287, at 93 (stating that the Tel-Oren decision is a
set back for the enforcement of human rights); Randall, Federal Questions, supra note 290
at 397-98 (arguing that Judge Bork's argument "begs the essential question of whether
individuals have private causes of action for certain international law violations").
316. See D'Amato, supra note 287, at 99-100 (dispelling the myth that a non-self-exe-
cuting treaty can not be self-executing and provide a private cause of action; further stating
that a "non-self-executing treaty would be 'violated' in a manner that could cause harm to
an individual plaintiff").
317. See id. at 99 (making a distinction between treaties that regulate trade and those
that enforce human rights).
318. See id. (using the example of a treaty that regulates the trade of hams between
two nations).
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general is affected.319 No court in the United States would grant a private
cause of action in that case 320 However, in the case of a treaty meant to
regulate human rights, individuals are the target of the treaty's protec-
tion.321 An example of such a treaty is the Torture Convention?2
Another argument against Judge Bork's stance is that the human rights
standards provided for in international law are the same as those pro-
vided in the broad language of our Constitution.323 The personal rights
included in such treaties as the Torture Convention are the same as those
self-executing rights in such Constitutional clauses as the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3" The Constitution provides that
"[no] person shall be.. . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."3 More importantly, the constitution also provides that
slavery and involuntary servitude shall not exist within the jurisdiction of
the United States.326 The international human rights standards are very
similar to those same rights given to us in the Constitution.32 7 Therefore,
enforcement of such rights would not subject a defendant to an unfore-
seen situation.
ii. The "Laws" Language
Another way subject matter jurisdiction arises from Section 1331 is
from the "laws" language of the statute.32 8 Implied from the word "laws"
319. See id. (stating that the country whose economy is adversely affected has a cause
of action rather than a private party).
320. See id at 99 n.21 (claiming that close to 5,700 cases have denied a claim based on
a non-self-executing treaty regulating trade).
321. See id (emphasizing that when human beings are directly hurt non-self-executing
treaties become self-executing).
322. See Randall, Federal Questions, supra note 290, at 398 (proposing that federal
rights include the right to be free of such crimes as torture and slavery). The Torture
Convention is a treaty signed by the members of the U.N. to prevent all forms of torture.
See THOMAS BUERGENTAL, IN'TRNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHS-rS 72-76 (2d ed. 1995) (describ-
ing the treaty as concerned with governmental actors, as well as private actors). The con-
vention's signatories are required to pass certain legislation. See id. Further, the
Convention places legal obligations on private individuals. See Randall, supra note 290, at
389-90 (describing the treaty as self-executing).
323. See Randall, Federal Questions, supra note 290, at 396 (summarizing those rights
and duties imposed upon individuals situated differently).
324. See iL
325. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
326. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIIf (abolishing involuntary servitude).
327. See Randall, Federal Questions, supra note 290, at 398 (acknowledging the fact
that clauses in the Covenant and the Torture Convention have been used to establish laws
in the United States).
328. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (granting federal district courts authority to hear
claims arising out of federal questions).
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in Section 1331 is an area of law that the federal judiciary has adopted
and from which causes of action can be created.' The common law is
created by federal judges when ruling on issues that are not addressed in
the codified statutes or the Constitution.33 Sometimes, this judge made
law creates a cause of action through the court's ruling.331
When plaintiffs litigate issues concerning international law, federal
common law is generally involved.332 Federal common law is at issue be-
cause the litigant is dealing with an area of the law that has not been
codified and is generally a matter of national concern.33 3 Human rights,
for example, are of national concern because of the United State's reli-
ance on this factor in its foreign policy; therefore, federal common law
should regulate human rights claims."
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that international law is part of fed-
eral common law,335 but courts are split regarding whether Section 1331
provides for a private cause of action under international law.336 Once
329. See id at 376 (asserting that a cause of action is created "from the substantive law
that the federal judiciary creates or adopts").
330. See id.
331. See id. at 376-77 (stating that Erie "'led to the emergence of a federal decisional
law in areas of national concern'", but only in cases where there is a lack of diversity and
positive federal law insufficiently regulates the interests of the federal government). In
fact, Justice Douglas once ruled that "federal courts have an extensive responsibility of
fashioning rules of substantive law... These rules are fully laws of United State as if...
enacted by Congress." Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99 (1972).
332. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,427-28 (1964) (recogniz-
ing that when there is popular agreement regarding an aspect of international law, the
judicial branch should be able to decide whether the rule is consistent with the national
interest). In Baco Nacional, the Cuban government tried to sue an American commodities
banker for stealing bills of lading in the United States. See id. at 405-06.
333. See id. at 428.
334. See 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1994) (requiring the United States to deny assistance to
any country that "engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally rec-
ognized human rights"). See generally Anthony D' Amato, The Concept of Human Rights
in International Law, 82 CoLuM. L REv. 1110 (1982) (stating that in the 1970's, the United
States made the evaluation of human rights a permanent method in which we analyze our
relations with other countries).
335. See, eg., The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (finding that
"[ilnternational law is part of [American] law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination."); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,246
(2d Cir. 1995) (stressing that "federal common law incorporates international law"); Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980) (deciding that the "law of nations forms
an integral part of the common law, and a review of the history surrounding the adoption
of the Constitution demonstrates that it became a part of the common law of the United
States upon adoption of the Constitution").
336. Compare Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (suggesting that "there be an explicit grant of a cause of action
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provided with the importance of human rights and the applicability of
human rights mandates to individuals, courts should provide jurisdiction
for a private cause of action. The human rights violated in Pollack are
clearly a case in point.337
An objective look at Second Circuit jurisprudence regarding the Alien
Tort Claims Act and the Federal Question Act reveals a potential incon-
sistency if a Pollack claim is denied. The Filartiga and Kadic rulings rec-
ognize a cause of action committed on foreign soil for an alien.
Nevertheless, if subject matter jurisdiction is denied in cases such as Pol-
lack, which base jurisdiction on Section 1331, then, potentially, a cause of
action would be available in the Second Circuit for an alien, but not for a
U.S. citizen. In other words, a Pollack plaintiff, who is an alien to the
United States, will have a cause of action in the Second Circuit under the
Alien Torts Claims Act because of the Kadic and Filartiga cases. How-
ever, a Pollack plaintiff, who happens to be a citizen of the United States,
will not have a cause of action in the Second Circuit if their claim under
the Federal Question Statute is denied.
b. 28 U.S.C. § 1332
The Pollack plaintiffs have plead in the alternative, that the court has
jurisdiction under the diversity of citizenship statute.3 8 Under Section
1332 district courts "have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of a state and citizens or
subjects of a foreign state."33 9 The plaintiffs in this case live in Penn-
sylvania, Ohio, New York, Nevada, Illinois, Florida, Connecticut, and
before a private plaintiff be allowed to enforce principles of international law in federal
tribunal"), and Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425, 1427 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (stat-
ing that the law of nations does not create a civil action unless local laws allow such ac-
tions), with Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir. 1987) (granting
jurisdiction based on a complaint that claims a "'right to recover under the Constitution
and laws of the United States"' (quoting Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Division, 457 U.S.
15, 21 n.6 (1982) and Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1544 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(deciding that "interpretation of international law is a federal question," and a claim under
international law is equally "as colorable as the RICO claim;" therefore, jurisdiction
should be invoked).
337. Cf Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995) (granting jurisdiction for
violations of international law); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887-89 (2d Cir. 1980)
(granting original jurisdiction based on the Alien Tort Statute).
338. See Class Action Complaint 2, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499 (E.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 30, 1998) (on file with The Scholar: St Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
339. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
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California.3 4 ° The defendants, however, are incorporated in Austria and
Germany? 4 And, the amount in controversy will exceed over $75,000
per plaintiff.3 42 Although the diversity jurisdiction statute does not create
a cause of action, the statute does give the district court power to adjudi-
cate a claim?43
2. Personal Jurisdiction
The defendants in the Fishel case successfully attacked the plaintiff's
assertion of jurisdiction by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction based on the corporations' lack of minimum contacts with the
country.3 4 The present case is a diversity case because the plaintiffs are
American citizens and the defendants are foreign corporations. 4 s In
such cases, the forum state's personal jurisdiction law will be used by the
court.?4 In the Pollack case the forum state is New York.? 7 "Under
New York's [Long Arm Statute] a foreign corporation is subject to suit in
New York state courts if it is engaged in such a continuous and systematic
course of 'doing business' here as to warrant a finding of its 'presence' in
this jurisdiction." " 8 In Pollack, extensive discovery likely will be allowed
to find exactly what connections the defendants or their subsidiaries have
to New York 34
9
340. See Class Action Complaint 3-12, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499
(E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 30,1998) (on file with The Sdolar SL Mary's Law Review on Minor-
ity Issues).
341. See id at 13-16 (listing each defendant's main office).
342. See id. at 2 (pleading each plaintiff's damages in excess of $75,000).
343. See Stephanie A. Bilenker, Comment, In Re Holocaust Victim's Assets Litiga-
tion: Do the U.S. Courts Have Jurisdiction Over the Lawsuits Filed by Holocaust Survivors
Against The Swiss Banks?, 21 MD. J. IN'L L & TRADE 251,269-70 (1997) (describing the
basis for the claims against Swiss Banks under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a)).
344. See Nazi Victim Can't Sue Here, NAt'L L.J., Mar. 30, 1998, at AS (quoting Judge
Longstaff as saying "'[t]here is no evidence any defendant maintains an office, employees
or agents, bank accounts or registered agents in Iowa"').
345. See Class Action Complaint 2, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499 (E.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 30, 1998)) (on fie with The Sclolar. S Afary's Law Review on Minority Issues)
(describing the parties in the Pollack suit).
346. See, eg., Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, 101 F.3d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1996) (discuss-
ing the jurisdictional issues of a diversity case).
347. See Class Action Complaint 1, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499 (E.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 30, 1998) (on file with The Sdholar: S. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
348. Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, 101 F.3d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting
N.Y.C.P.L.R. 301 (McKinney 1990)).
349. See id (ruling that the court must decide jurisdiction "based upon allegations of
the parties and affidavits filed in support of their arguments"). "While the plaintiff bears
the ultimate burden of establishing jurisdiction over the defendant by a preponderance of
the evidence, until discovery takes place, a plaintiff is required only to make a prima facie
showing by pleadings and affidavits that jurisdiction exists." Id.
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The plaintiffs allege that all the defendants either have offices or do
extensive business in New York 50 Volkswagen,35 1 Mercedes-Benz,
3 2
Audi,353 and BMW354 are all automobile companies that sell an extensive
amount of cars in the state of New York. Siemens sells a wide range of
products all over the United States, including health care products and
automation products. 35 5 Among the items that Krupp sells in the United
States are automotive products 56 Henkel sells a wide range of products
throughout the United States including adhesives and cosmetics.3 7 Leica
sells cameras all over the world, including the United States.35 8
When a court evaluates whether it has jurisdiction over a foreign de-
fendant it necessarily looks to the fairness of forcing that defendant to
defend a suit in that court.359 In the Pollack case concepts of fairness not
only permit the court to exercise jurisdiction, but mandate that it does so.
For example, in Pollack, the defendant corporations all do business in
New York, the witnesses, most likely the plaintiffs, are in the United
States and the forum would be an appropriate and convenient place for
all parties to engage in this litigation. Therefore, the court should hold
that the defendants are subject to its jurisdiction.
350. See Class Action Complaint 13-16, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499
(E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 30,1998) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minor-
ity Issues) (depicting each defendant-corporation).
351. See Test Driv Locate a Dealer Near You (visited Feb. 19,1999) <http://dealerlo-
cate.vw.com/cgi-bin/getdealerwebtable.exe> (illustrating that there are two Volkswagen
dealerships within 5 miles of the Eastern District's courthouse). In fact, one can buy a new
Bug within 3 miles of the Eastern District Court of New York. See id.
352. See Worldwide Locations (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http://www.dairlerchrysler.de/
company/worldwide/worldwide_e.htm> (giving Daimler Chrysler's locations as
worldwide).
353. See Dealers Nearest You (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http'//dealerlocate.vw.com/cgi-
bin/getdealerwebtable.exe> (describing that there are two Audi dealerships within 5 miles
of the courthouse).
354. See BMW Centers (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http://wwv.bmwusa.com/centers/
center.taf> (listing that there is a BMW dealership in Manhattan).
355. See The Company, United States (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http:IlwwW.siemens,de/
en/the..company/areitsgebiete/index.html> (describing products made by Siemens).
356. See Business Scene Management Report (visited Mar. 9, 1999) <http'/
www.krupp.comIGB98/ngllage2.htm> (describing its NAFTA market).
357. See Henkel Worldwide, Henkel Group (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <httpl
wwv.henkel.com/intli/henkel.html> (illustrating Henkel's product line).
358. See Leica USA (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http://www.leica-camera.com/usa/in-
dex.htm> (stating that Leica has a gallery in New York).
359. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (ruling that
for a state to subject a foreign defendant to its jurisdiction, the due process clause requires
"'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"'); see also World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,297 (1980) (finding that a defendant's conduct and
its ties to the forum state determine if it can be subject to a foreign forum's court).
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3. The Universality Principle and the Political Question Doctrine
Traditionally, when a court is determining whether it has jurisdiction, it
considers whether it is infringing on another judicial or political institu-
tion's expressed powers.3 60 The court conducts a two part analysis when
determining whether it is interfering with another institution's expressed
powers.36' The court first asks whether, on the national level, granting
jurisdiction would violate the separation of powers between other
branches of government.36 Second, it asks whether, on the international
level, granting jurisdiction interferes with the equilibrium of the world
legal order.363 As in the Pollack case, where the forum court has no tie
to the offense at issue, a court traditionally will not grant jurisdiction for
fear that it will interfere with the institutions of either one of these
spheres.3l Under the universality principle, however, courts are given
authority to hear claims of a severe nature despite the fact that the court
has no nexus with the action.365
Courts of various states have asserted jurisdiction using the universality
principle when they believed that the accused is "an enemy to all peo-
ple."'3 66 Universal Jurisdiction was first used to assert jurisdiction over
360. See Randall, Federal Questions, supra note 290, at 415 (discussing the conse-
quences of invoking jurisdiction in an international human rights case).
361. See id. (stating a court must determine whether it is upsetting the division of
authority among the local and foreign spheres, as well as political and legal spheres).
362. See id. (relating that in our domestic system of justice there are concern for fed-
eralism and separation of powers). In light of these concerns, however, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 the federal judiciary has authority to hear human rights cases as compared to state
courts or the other political offices. See id
363. See id. (describing how a federal court should determine whether it has legiti-
mate authority over "human rights claims not just vis-a-vis the United States legal system,
but also vis-a-vis the world legal order").
364. See id. at 416-17 (listing the traditional basis for domestic court jurisdiction as the
territoriality principle, "the nationality principle, the passive personality principle, and the
protective principle").
365. See id. at 416 (asserting that universality applies to a "limited array of offenses
that strike at the foundations and first principles of the world legal order").
366. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992-) (ruling that
the conviction of a man kidnapped from Mexico and brought to the United States by DEA
agents comported with international law); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir.
1995) (citing the Supreme Court as ruling that "pirates were 'hostis humani generis' (an
enemy of all mankind)"); Flartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (ruling
that the "torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani
generis, an enemy of all mankind"); In re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 555 (N.D. Ohio
1985) (stating that under the concept of universality, Israel has jurisdiction over a Holo-
caust prison guard); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212,215 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (recog-
nizing the universality principle to invoke jurisdiction over a man who killed a U.S.
politician in Guyana). Another case involving the universality principle is the Adolf Eich-
mann case. See Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Trans-
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pirates. 67 The two long standing offenses that invoke the universality
principle are slavery and piracy, but the list is expanding along with the
expansion of international law.36 The behavior of Nazi industrialists
during WWII should be added to the category of violations that invoke
the universality principle.369 Surely, the behavior of the defendant com-
panies in Pollack invokes universal jurisdiction.
There are two arguments against asserting universal jurisdiction against
the Nazis. 70 The first argument is that pirates are different from the Na-
zis in that they committed their crimes on the seas where there is univer-
sal jurisdiction, while the Nazis committed their crimes in a certain state's
territory. 1 However, this distinction loses its appeal when one realizes
that it is the act itself that triggers universality, rather than the location of
the violation. The second argument is that the acts of pirates are a pri-
vate action while the acts of the Nazis were under governmental
power.3"2 This distinction seems to strengthen the Pollack plaintiffs as-
sertion that the Pollack court has jurisdiction because the defendants are
private parties, not a government. The defendant corporations followed
the advancing German army into Poland, where they decided to build
factories and enslave Jews and others from Nazi concentration camps.
Both piracy and slavery are the two oldest and most accepted categories
formation, 106 YALE LJ. 2009, 2046 n.150 (1997) (describing hold the universality
principle was considered in Eichmann's case). Eichmann, a Nazi leader, oversaw the exter-
mination process of the Jews during the Holocaust. See Andrew David Wolfberg, Israel v.
Ivan (John) Demjanjuk- Wachmann Demjanjuk Allowed To Go Free, 17 Loy. L.A. Ir'tL
& Comp. LJ. 445, 453 (1995). Ten years after Nuremberg and escaping the allies, holo-
caust survivors found him in Argentina, kidnapped him and brought him to Israel. See id.
at 454. The Israeli Court based jurisdiction on universality. See id. at 455. A more recent
case raising universality, involves Augusto Pinochet, Chile's former dictator, who commit-
ted crimes against humanity during his tenure. See John Bolton, General Pinochet's Polit-
ical Persecution, Ausmr. FIN. Rnv., at 13, available in 1999 WL 5065221. Pinochet, at the
time this paper was written, was in England. See id And, a Spanish magistrate had asked
for Pinochet's extradition to Spain based on the universality principle. See id.
367. See Randall, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 291, at 791 (describing how
"[elvery state has long had legislative, adjudicatory, and enforcement jurisdiction over all
piratical acts on the high seas, even when neither the pirates nor their victims are nationals
of the prosecuting state and the offense has no specific connection to the prosecuting
state").
368. See id. at 790-91 (adding to piracy and slavery the offenses of terrorism,
apartheid, and torture).
369. See id at 803 (making the comparison between piracy and Nazi crimes).
370. See id at 804 (noting the differences between piracy and war crimes, but empha-
sizing the similarities of the egregious acts).
371. See id (arguing that it should not be the jurisdiction in which a ship is registered
that triggers jurisdiction, but the act).
372. See id at 804 (stating that the post-war tribunal ignored this distinction).
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of violations for which the universality principle is invoked. The defend-
ants' actions fit the characteristics of both categories.
D. Statute of Limitations
A statute of limitations issue emerges in the Pollack claim because the
occurrence in question accrued over fifty years ago."7a The rationale for
dismissing a case based on statute of limitations is to prevent stale
claims3 7 4 Therefore, this issue can also be a significant barrier for other
types of human rights claims 75 This same question was an issue in both
the Swiss Bank cases 76 and the Fishetr7 case. In Fishel, Judge Longstaff
cited statute of limitations as one of the reasons for deciding the case in
the defendants' favor.37" The Swiss Bank plaintiffs were prepared, if the
situation arose, to argue that equitable principles barred the defendants
from making a statute of limitations argument" 79 The same equitable
arguments available to the Swiss Bank plaintiffs are available to the Pol-
lack plaintiffs.
However, there is no provided statute of limitations for Section
1331.380 Generally, when Congress provides a statutory civil cause of ac-
tion, as in the case of Section 1331, and there is no statute of limitations
provided, the district court must find a statute of limitation from a state
373. Cf Bilenker, supra note 343, at 275 (discussing how the defendant Swiss Banks
reserved the right to argue statute of limitations).
374. See Allbrand Appliance & Television Co., Inc. v. Caloric Corp., 875 F.2d 1021,
1025 (2d Cir. 1989) (reiterating that statutes of limitations prevent stale claims).
375. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) (providing a ten year statute of limitation for certain
types of human rights claims). See also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,245 (2d Cir. 1995)
(describing how a victim of torture has a claim under the Torture Victim act, which bars
claims over ten years old); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1547-52 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (discussing the statute of limitations issue in an international human rights claim
involving an Argentinian General who allegedly tortured the plaintiffs); Von Dardet v.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 259-60 (D.C. 1985) (discussing how
statute of limitations could be an issue if the plaintiff, who was abducted by the Russians is
dead).
376. See Bileaker, supra note 343, at 251 (discussing the statute limitations issue in the
Swiss Bank Cases).
377. See Holocaust Lawsuit Thrown Out Judge Rules Federal Court Lacks Jurisdiction
in Survivor's Case, OriAH.A WoRLm-HEnA , Mar. 17, 1998, at 13 (reporting Judge Long-
staff as saying that besides jurisdiction, statute of limitations would also be a problem in
this case).
378. See id.
379. See Bilenker, supra note 343, at 251 (discussing the statute of limitations issue in
the Swiss Bank Cases). The Swiss Bank cases never went to trial because the parties set-
tied out of court. See Jewish Groups OK Swiss Holocaust Fund Plan; German Banks Seek
to Dismiss $18 billion Suit (visited Nov. 21, 1998) <http'JAvww.cnn.comlWORLD/europe/
9811/21/holocaust.01/.
380. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
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statute that correlates with the federal statute. 8' An exception to the
general rule of adopting the correlating state statute arises in situations
where adopting the state statute will defeat legislative intent or where
there is a need for uniformity of laws.3" Consequently, courts can look
to several different sources for the limitations statute that correlates most
closely with the legislative intent of Congress.383
The Pollack plaintiffs will fight a losing battle in trying to find a statute
of limitations period longer than fifty years to prevent their cause of ac-
tion from tolling. The Torture Victim Protection Act, which was adopted
into the notes of the Alien Tort Claims Act in 1992, has a statute of limi-
tations period of ten years."s The Torture Victims Protection Act is a
381. See Agency Holding Co. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 146 (1987)
(stating that state law is almost always applied when there is no statute of limitations in-
cluded in a federal claim); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266.67 (1985) (deciding the test
courts should follow when trying to determine which state statute of limitations law applies
best). There is a three-step process for determining the correct statute of limitation. See,12
U.S.C. § 1988 (1994), construed in Garcia, 471 U.S. at 268.68. First, the court ruled that
one must look to the federal law for guidance. See id. Second, when no guidance is given
in the federal laws, courts should look to state common law. See id. However, there is a
third step that instructs courts not to apply state law if it is inconsistent with federal law.
See id There is another three-step process to determine the appropriate state law. See id.
at 268. The court stated that one must first consider whether state law or federal law
governs the characterization of [the federal statute] for statute of limitation purposes." Id.
When federal law is applied, the question becomes whether all federal claims under the
federal statute should be classified in that manner or whether factual and theoretical differ-
ences between the cases should require an evaluation of each individual case. See id. Last,
the court must decide the essence of the case in order to find the most analogous statute of
limitations. See id
382. See Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 150 (ruling that another federal statute is
better suited to provide a statute of limitation in RICO cases); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 267
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994)); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162,190 (D. Mass. 1995)
(stating that federal law should be applied if applying state law would defeat the purpose
of the federal statute or there is a special need for uniformity); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672
F. Supp. 1531, 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (recognizing that "where a rule from elsewhere in
federal law provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and better accommo-
dates federal policies and the practicalities of litigation, a federal limitations period may
better bridge the gap left open by Congress").
383. See Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 147 (formulating that once the court has
decided "whether all claims arising out of the federal statute 'should be characterized in
the same way, or whether they should be evaluated differently depending upon the varying
factual circumstances and legal theories presented in each individual case"' then the court
should decide whether to use state or federal law); Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. at 1547-48
(considering state, federal and international law in its quest for the correct statute of
limitations).
384. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a)(2) (1994).
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good match with the Pollack claims and should be a good candidate for a
court to use as the statute of limitations in the present case.?ss
At first glance, it would seem that the plaintiffs' claims have tolled.
However, the plaintiffs allege that their claims should not toll because of
equitable tolling principles.316 The Pollack plaintiff's complaint alleges
that equitable tolling estops the defendants from arguing that the applica-
ble statute of limitations prevents the plaintiffs' case from continuing.as
In the past, the Second Circuit has adopted New York's equitable estop-
pel principles. 3s8 "[A] party may be estopped from raising a statute of
limitations defense where his fraud, concealment, or deception prevented
the plaintiff from timely filing his claim., 38 9 The Pollack complaint al-
leges that there was significant concealment on part of the defendant cor-
porations.39 Additionally, the plaintiffs allege that documents being held
in archives were only made public in 1995.391 These allegations have
been supported by at least two major news sources. 39 Only now, after
the Cold War has ended, are documents being released which confirm
what people originally suspected are true.3 93 The atrocities did occur on
a monstrous scale.
E. Forum Non Conveniens
A defendant invokes the doctrine of forum non conveniens to argue the
dismissal of a case where there is another forum which, potentially, has
385. Cf. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191 (adopting TVPA as the statute of limitations for
a Tile 28, Section 1350 claim).
386. See Class Action Complaint 20, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499
(E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 30,1998) (on file with The Sdzolar St Afarys Law Review on Minor-
ity Issues) (asserting that the defendants, "with the active assistance of others, concealed
information from plaintiffs").
387. See id. (stating that relevant facts about the case were not released until 1995).
388. See Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 1983) (adopting New York's
equitable estoppel principles).
389. Independent Order of Foresters v. Donald, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 157 F.3d 933,
942 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing New York's tolling principles).
390. See Class Action Complaint 20-21, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98CV-5499
(E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 30,1998) (on file with The Sdzolar St. Mary's Law Review on Minor-
ity Issues) (alleging facts that support a tolling defense to a statute of limitations).
391. See id.
392. See German Official to Push Holocaust Reparations Plan, supra note 14 (stating
that after the collapse of communism additional documents were discovered in East Ger-
man intelligence Piles); Alissa Kaplan, Why Pursue Assets Now? (visited Feb. 17, 1999)
<http.//abcnews.go.comlsectionsvorldnDailyNews/neutrasl03lwhynow.html> (reporting
that documents that are now being released are conclusive about the role of industry in the
Holocaust).
393. See Dateline NBC; supra note 41 (stating that dirty business secrets of WVVII
were being released from files sealed long ago).
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jurisdiction over the case. 394 The courts consider whether the chosen fo-
run would "establish... oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant...
out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience." 395 Another factor the
court will consider is whether the "chosen forum [is] inappropriate be-
cause of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal
problems. 396
District courts have wide discretion in determining whether a case must
be dismissed due to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 97 Interest-
ingly, the fact that a court has proper venue and jurisdiction is not a de-
terminative factor in the district court's analysis of the doctrine.398 The
court considers the argument on a "case by case basis., 399 At the same
time, courts recognize the strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff's se-
lection of forum and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there is
another appropriate forum.4"'
The cause of action in Pollack, as well as other human rights cases, is
statutorily provided. If forum non conveniens is the reasoning for a
court's dismissal of a human rights claim then a federal common law no-
tion would be defeating the legislative intent of Congress to allow such
claims.40 1 Further, the federal interest in protecting human rights that
the United States is obligated to enforce will be overridden by this notion
of common law.4° As a policy matter, forum non conveniens should be
abolished in international human rights cases.
403
394. See Scottish Air Int'l Inc. v. British Caledonian Group, 81 F.3d 1224, 1232 (2d
Cir. 1996) (citing the discussion of forum non conveniens from Overseas Nat'l Airways,
Inc. v. Cargolux Airlines Int'l, 712 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983)).
395. See Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947) (granting a
defendant's motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of forum non-conveniens).
396. See id.
397. See id (ruling that a district court's ruling regarding forum non-conveniens must
only be overturned if there is a clear abuse of discretion).
398. See id. (stating the determinative factors are access to evidence, cost to witnesses,
and other "private and public interest factors").
399. See Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, Inc., 981 F.2d 1345, 1349 (1st Cir. 1992) (defining
the burden placed on the defendant asking for removal from the local forum as substantial
unfairness).
400. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (stating the "plaintiff's
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed").
401. See Boyd, supra note 19, at 75-78 (stating the courts should adopt reasoning from
recent cases which have abolished forum non conveniens for cases involving the Clayton
Act).
402. See id (describing how certain federal regulations override common law
doctrines).
403. See id. at 84 (stating that there are other safeguards besides forum non con-
veniens that a court can use to dismiss a case if it is frivolous).
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The defendants will likely argue that Germany is the proper forum for
this case; especially in light of similar slave labor cases recently decided
by a German court 4°4 However, when considering the extenuating cir-
cumstances of this case, the court should maintain the presumption in
favor of the plaintiffs. The United States is a suitable venue for this case.
Both parties have a presence in the United States. The defendants en-
gage in millions of dollars worth of business in the U.S. and there is an
extensive amount of evidence and a great number of experts on the Holo-
caust in the United States. Furthermore, most of the witnesses, the vic-
tims themselves, reside in the United States.
IV. FOCUSING ON THE POLzcPARTEs-How Tim Powi ca-CAsE
Fi IN THE CHAIN OF HUMAN RiGHTS PROTECTION
The Pollack court is only one of the latest links in a legal and jurispru-
dential chain that dates back to the days after WWIL4 15 At the end of
the war, the civilized nations of the world were able to truly gauge the
atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi regime upon the Jewish people.40 6
With the realization of the magnitude of the crimes committed against all
humankind came a sense that it was necessary to set boundaries and pa-
rameters within which nation states could operate.4° For example, one
of the vehicles through which nations committed themselves to prevent-
ing any future re-occurrence of the events in WWII was the U.N.
charter. 08
The United Nations Charter encompasses minimal standards of human
rights.40 9 The United States bound itself to observe and enforce these
404. See Bonn Must Pay Auschwitz Slave Labourer Compensation, DEutrsCm
PREssE-AGENTUR, Nov. 5,1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, International News. A
German court ruled that one out of 22 women who were slave laborers should receive
compensation for her time spent as a slave laborer at Auschwitz. See id.
405. See Matthew Lippman, Fifty Years After Aushwitz: Prosecutions of Nazi Death
Camp Defendants, 11 CONN. J. IN'. L. 199, 278 (1996) (explaining that the death camp
cases arising out of WWII serve as precedent in cases involving the mistreatment of
civilians).
406. See Stephen A. Denburg, Note, Reclaiming Their Past A Survey of Jewish Ef-
forts to Restitute European Property, 18 B.C. THmD WoRW LJ. 233,235 (1998) (observing
that it was only after WWII that the full effect of the Holocaust on European Jewry was
clear to all).
407. See Buergenthal, supra note 20, at 6 (asserting that the evolution of the formali-
zation of human rights started after WVII).
408. See HuMiA. RiGHTrs n Tm WoR.LD Cormiutrry, supra note 23, at 8 (describing
how the Charter "states that a major purpose of the [United Nations] organization is to
achieve and promote respect for human rights").
409. See id. at 286 (discussing the institutionalization of human rights standards with
the U.N. Charter being the standard).
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human-rights standards when it ratified the Charter and became a mem-
ber of the United Nations.410 In fact, some would argue that as a perma-
nent member of the Security Council, the United States has a higher duty
to uphold the Charter. In order to uphold the standards of human rights
that have developed since World War II, many countries have internally
adopted these standards in their municipal laws and constitutions. 411
However, in order to ensure that the human rights guaranteed in docu-
ments such as the U.N. Charter are safeguarded, judicial bodies, such as
the court in Pollack, must enforce human rights standards.
4 12
The Pollack case can and should follow the course of the Filartiga and
Kadic decisions. In those landmark cases the United States judiciary
chose to live up to the United States' obligations as a signatory to the
United Nations Charter."1 3
The parties in Pollack should not cheapen the legacy of the Holocaust
by squabbling over money. The parties have a higher duty to ensure jus-
tice. Genocide spurs the development of a system where the government,
the main actor in the genocide, rewards a group of people or corporations
who gained from the genocide.414 Inevitably, the regimes that are the
main perpetrators of the genocide are removed, but the institutions that
helped perpetrate the crimes and subsequently gained from the genocide
continue to hold onto their power within that society.4"' After both
world wars, the corporations that helped Germany wage those wars were
kept in power mainly by politicians within the United States.4 16 "Thus,
the law and the crime became caught in a cycle in which the law facili-
tated the crime and the crime, in turn, helped institutionalize a form of
law with which it could coexist."417 The Pollack plaintiffs and other future
410. See icL (describing how Article 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter bind individual
signatories to those standards).
411. See id. at 286-87 (using Poland, the Netherlands, and the Philippines as an exam-
ple of using wording from the U.N. Charter in amendments to existing constitutions).
412. See id. at 287 (stating "international human rights are sought to be implemented
by way of litigation in domestic courts").
413. But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 800-01 (D.C. Circuit
1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (deciding to reject international human rights standards).
414. See SIMPSON, supra note 26, at 5 (describing how German companies cooperated
with the Nazis' plans of Aryanization in exchange for the government's aid in maintaining
their status).
415. See id. at 6 (illustrating how institutions within genocidal regimes maintain their
power even after regimes themselves have been removed).
416. See id. at 12. The Dulles brothers and others in the State Department conspired
after both Wars to keep the German establishment in power with the intention of keeping
West Germany strong a buffer to the Communist regime. See id.
417. SIMPSON, supra note 26, at 6.
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human rights claimants should seek to stop this system of injustice, and,
as such, should be fostered not hindered in their pursuits of justice.
V. CONCLUSION
As a world community, we must never forget what happened during
the Holocaust and continue learning from it as a disastrous incident in
world history. We can use the Holocaust's legacy to further human rights
protection. Progress has been made in the human rights area in the past
fifty years, but we have not gone far enough. Evidence of our failures to
stop human rights violations are the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia
and Africa and how helpless the world community is from stopping these
horrors.418 There are new human rights victims being born everyday.
This is unacceptable.
Success by the Pollack plaintiffs would strike a blow against the system
of justice that left war criminals without prosecution after WWI and re-
turned the slave-master corporations of WWII to the owners who had
violated millions of people's human rights. Further, a Pollack success
would be a step toward holding violating parties responsible for the con-
sequences of their actions. Knowing that we cannot rid the world of
atrocities, we must strive to hold all violators of human rights responsible
for their actions. This comment's proposal is one of the steps toward that
goal.
418. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Crimes Against Humaniy: Nuremberg Comes Back to
Haunt Pinodet, LA. Timsns, Dec. 20, 1998, at M! (asserting that the world has failed "to
repress 'ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia and genocide in Rwanda").
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